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ABSTRACT
From 1787 until 1792 the issue of the apportionment of 
representatives in the House of Representatives was the 
focus of spirited debate in American politics. The central 
issue at stake was the size and influence of each of the 
sections in future Congresses. The representation issue was 
first debated during the Constitutional Convention in 1787. 
After a temporary settlement of the representation guestion 
in the Convention, the First Congress re-opened the 
apportionment debate. The result was a constitutional 
amendment that would have significantly increased the size 
of the House of Representatives. After that amendment 
failed to pass the states, the Second Congress finally 
passed in 1792 an apportionment bill that increased the 
House in size in time for the convening of the Third 
Congress in March 1793.
No historian that I know of has addressed the 
representation debate after the Constitutional Convention. 
Therefore, the details of the debate over the apportionment 
amendment remained unexamined. Additionally, the contest in 
the Second House to increase the size of the House has been 
virtually ignored.
This paper therefore addresses the representation 
debate from 1787 to 1792. Starting with the Constitutional
v n
Convention of 1787, I have traced the representation 
question through the First Congress and the failed 
apportionment amendment to the debate's conclusion in the 
Second Congress.
Both primary and secondary sources were used in the 
research of this paper. Additionally, legislative roll call 
analysis was used to determine the degree of sectionalism 
surrounding the representation debate in the Second 
Congress.
The conclusion of my research is that North-South 
sectionalism played a significant role in the apportionment 
debate. The question of slavery's place in the 
apportionment of representatives was central to the debate 
in the Constitutional Convention. Although the slavery 
question was settled by the "three-fifths compromise," the 
North and the South, after the Convention, divided along 
sectional lines on the question of how large of an increase 
in the size of the House of Representatives was necessary.
By the Second Congress the South had split with the North on 
that issue. But within the North, two distinct voting blocs 
emerged. The New England and the Mid-Atlantic states 
fractured over the details of limiting the increase in the 
number of representatives in the House. Thus, by 1792, a 
distinct North-South sectionalism over the size and make-up 
of the House of Representatives was present in American 
politics.
vixi
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A quandary faced American statesmen in 1787 when they 
attempted to establish the new American government. With a 
tradition of opposition to the royal government's perceived 
abuses of power, the founding fathers put their hopes for 
the United States' future in the separation of powers. In 
their Novus Ordo Seclorum the legislature would predominate. 
But there was no acceptable precedent for apportionment of 
representation among the states in the national legislature 
so that the Congress neither dominated the polity nor was 
subject to the majority's whims and caprices. Thus, James 
Madison's dictum that "You must first enable the government 
to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to 
control itself,"1 became the benchmark of a protracted and 
complex debate surrounding the apportionment of 
representatives in the House of Representatives.
The apportionment issue was first debated at the 
meeting of the First Continental Congress. Virginia, with 
20 percent of the country's population, unsuccessfully
1Publius, The Federalist 51, from New York Independent 
Journal, 6 February 1788, John P. Kaminski et al., eds., 
Commentaries on the Constitution; Public and Private, vols. 13-16 of The Documentary History of the Ratification of the 
Constitution, 16 vols., ed. Merrill Jensen (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976-1986), 16:44 
(hereinafter cited as Commentaries).
1
2argued for proportional representation in the national 
legislature. In 1776 Virginia, with the assistance of 
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, again unsuccessfully 
demanded that proportional representation should be the 
basis for representation in the national legislature.2 When 
the Continental Congress ratified the Articles of 
Confederation in 1777, the debate surrounding the 
apportionment of representation was temporarily settled. In 
lieu of proportional representation, each state was given an 
equal vote in the national legislature.3 Not until 1789 and 
the ratification of the Federal Constitution was the 
apportionment of representation in the Congress 
significantly altered.
Although the public debate on the apportionment of 
representatives appeared negligible throughout the 
Confederation period, certain key points of the later debate 
did emerge. By 1781 and the states' ratification of the 
Articles of Confederation, the North and the South were 
convinced that distinct social, economic, and political 
differences existed between them.4 The apportionment issue
2Merrill Jensen, ed., Constitutional Documents and Records, 1776-1787, vol. 1, The Documentary History of the 
Ratification of the Constitution, 16 vols. (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976-1986), 1: 240 (hereinafter cited as Documents).
3Act of Confederation of the United States of America, 
ibid., 1: 87. Article V of the Article of Confederation 
guaranteed each state an equal vote in the national 
legislature.
^Documents, 1: 240.
3was clearly linked to those differences, and none more 
markedly than slavery. If, for example, the apportionment 
of representatives in the national legislature was to be 
based on population, were slaves to count as citizens? If 
apportionment were to be based on property and tax quotas, 
should slaves be counted as taxable property? If for 
taxation purposes the national government’s expenses were to 
be divided among the states based on their respective 
numbers in the national legislature, where did slaves fit 
into the determination of each state's representation?
When the Constitutional Convention convened in May 
1787, the issue of the apportionment of representatives in 
the national legislature again entered American politics at 
the national level. Delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention vigorously debated the apportionment of 
representatives in the future Congress. Alexander Hamilton 
noted,
the small states, seeing themselves embraced by the 
Confederation on equal terms, wished to retain the 
advantages which they already possessed. The large 
states, on the contrary, thought it improper that Rhode 
Island and Delaware should enjoy an equal suffrage with 
themselves. From these sources of conflict a delicate 
and difficult contest arose. It became necessary, 
therefore, to compromise, or the Convention would have 
dissolved without effecting any thing.5 5
5That compromise entailed equal representation in the 
Senate and proportional representation on the House of 
Representatives. Alexander Hamilton to the New York 
Convention, 20 June 1788, Max Farrand, ed., The Records of 
the Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911-37, 4 vols.; reprint, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1966), 4 vols., 3: 337 (page references are to 
reprint edition, hereinafter cited as Farrand, Records).
4However, the compromise reached in the Constitutional 
Convention was short lived. During the ratification contest 
in the states, the apportionment issue again became the 
focus of debate. But the issues surrounding the 
apportionment of representatives to the House of 
Representatives had changed. Rather than focusing on 
slavery's role in apportionment calculations, which had been 
effectively settled by the noted three-fifths compromise, 
the debate following the Constitution's ratification 
centered on the size of the increase in the House of 
Representatives. Coupled with the arguments surrounding the 
costs of maintaining the Congress, the apportionment debate 
increasingly divided Northerners and Southerners.
Although by 1789 nine states had ratified the 
Constitution, it was clear that many individuals within 
those same states found the Constitution's apportionment 
clause inadeguate. The First Congress therefore debated an 
apportionment amendment to the Constitution. The result was 
an amendment that would have significantly increased the 
number of representatives in future Congresses.
Additionally, the First Congress also submitted an amendment 
to the states prohibiting the Congress from granting itself 
a mid-term pay raise. When the apportionment amendment 
failed to pass the states in 1791, the Second Congress, 
after extended debate, codified and passed an apportionment 
law incorporating a representation ratio acceptable to the 
majority of representatives.
5Although the question of the apportionment of 
representatives in the Congress was a central issue in 
American politics from 1787 to 1792, the details and 
significance of that debate have yet to be the focus of an 
in-depth historical analysis. Many questions surrounding 
that debate remained unanswered. For example, why was the 
apportionment issue so vigorously contested? What were the 
public and private arguments presented during the debate? 
What voting blocs and coalitions emerged throughout the 
course of the debate? Did Northerners align against 
Southerners on the apportionment issue, or did the sections 
fracture into coalitions of divergent interests?
Contemporaries understood the significance of the
debate surrounding the apportionment of representatives in
the Congress. The Pennsylvania Gazette on 5 March 1788
noted that "The American seems to be duly impressed with the
propriety and duty of making the voice of the majority the
law of the land."6 An opponent of the Constitution noted
that the essential parts of free and good government "are a
full and equal representation of the people in the
legislature. . . ."7 Madison, in The Federalist 55, wrote,
The number of which the House of Representatives is to 
consist forms another, and a very interesting point of 
view under which this branch of the federal legislature
Pennsylvania Gazette. 5 March 1788, Commentaries, 16:321.
^Federal Farmer, Letters to the Republican, 9 October 1787, ibid., 14: 25-26.
6may be contemplated. Scarce any article indeed in the 
whole constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention, by the weight of character and the apparent 
force of argument, with which it has been assailed.8
Yet, few historians have considered the apportionment 
debate from 1787 to 1792. Most historians of the 
Confederation and early Federalist periods have focused on 
aspects other than the apportionment issue. But the 
historical debates surrounding the social, economic, and 
ideological divisions in American society are germane. One 
can discern distinct divisions in American politics on a 
wide range of issues. Perhaps the apportionment issue was 
one such issue.
One school of historians has taken notice of the 
divisions in American politics at the time of the convening 
of the Constitutional Convention in May 1787. Charles A. 
Beard, in An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of 
the United States, spoke of the economic divisions within 
the Convention. Forrest McDonald, in We the People, stated 
that the Convention was the product of several conflicting 
interests and elements. David Smith likewise noted the 
ideological and economic cleavage in the American polity by 
1789, in The Convention and the Constitution. Orin Libby, 
in The Geographical Distribution of the Vote of the Thirteen 
States on the Federal Constitution, 1787-8, contended that
8Publius, The Federalist 55, from New York Independent 
Journal, 13 February 1788, ibid., 16: 111.
7"the areas of intercourse and wealth carried the 
Constitution."9
Conversely, John P. Roche, in "The Convention as a Case 
Study in Democratic Politics," wrote of the Convention 
delegates' political unity. He claimed that the 
Constitutional Convention can be viewed as a nationalist 
reform caucus without the presence of clear-cut ideological 
divisions among the delegates. Robert E. Brown's Charles A. 
Beard and the Constitution: A Critical Analysis of "An 
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution" contended the 
delegates to the Convention were in fact a homogeneous group 
with little class conflict.10
A North-South sectionalism has been many historians' 
theme when discussing the Constitutional Convention. Lance 
Banning, in The Jeffersonian Persuasion, wrote that by 1787 
profound economic and social differences were present
9Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: The Macmilliam 
Company, 1913), 324-25; Forrest McDonald, We the People: The 
Economic Origins of the Constitution (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), 416; David G. Smith, The Convention and the Constitution: The Political Ideals of the 
Founding Fathers (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 58; 
Orin G. Libby, The Geographical Distribution of the Vote of 
the Thirteen States on the Federal Constitution, 1787-8 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1894; reprint, New York: 
Burt Franklin, 1969), 49 (page references are to reprint 
edition).
10John P. Roche, "The Convention as a Case Study in 
Democratic Politics" in Leonard W. Levy, ed., Essays on the 
Making of the Constitution (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1969), 179; Robert E. Brown, Charles A. Beard and the 
Constitution: A Critical Analysis of "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution" (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1956), 20-21.
8between the democratic oriented North and the aristocratic 
South and the commercial East and the agricultural West. 
Andrew C. McLauglin's A Constitutional History of the United 
States also noted that a distinct sectionalism between both 
the East and the West and the North and the South was indeed 
present in the Convention. Charles Warren, in The Making of 
the Constitution, considered the relationship between the 
apportionment issue and sectionalism. He wrote that the 
struggle surrounding apportionment was between the South, 
Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts on one side and the rest of 
the Union on the other. Staughton Lynd stated, in Class 
Conflict, Slavery, and the United States Constitution, that 
conflict between the North and the South preceded the 
Convention. North-South sectionalism subsequently played a 
dividing role in the convention.11
Max Farrand's The Framing of the Constitution of the 
United States noted different interests within the 
Convention. He stated that the major divisions surrounding 
the apportionment issue were between the small states and 
the large states. Catherine Drinker Bowen, in Miracle at 
Philadelphia, seconded Farrand's interpretation of the small
11Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution 
of a Party Ideology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1978), 107; Andrew C. McLaughlin, A Constitutional History of the United States (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1935), 186; Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1937), 246; Staughton 
Lynd, Class Conflict, Slavery, and the United States Constitution (New York: The Bobbs-Merril Company, 1967), 14.
9states opposed to the large states, not the South aligned 
against the North or the East against the West.12
Only one historian that I know of has directly 
addressed sectionalism’s role in the specifics of the 
apportionment debate during the Constitutional Convention. 
Calvin Jillson, in Constitution Making, noted that the 
apportionment issue was one of the clearest North-South 
confrontations in the Convention. Kenneth R. Bowling's 
"Politics in the First Congress, 1789-1791" took the issue 
of sectionalism one step further. He wrote that sectional 
interests dominated debates during the First Congress.13 
Unfortunately, no historian has yet discussed the dual 
issues of apportionment and sectionalism in the Second 
Congress.
While there is paucity of secondary sources on the 
debate from 1787 to 1792 over the apportionment of 
representatives in the House of Representatives, it is 
possible to present that debate’s public and private details 
and progression. Research utilizing both contemporary 
commentaries and legislative roll call analysis indicates
12Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the 
United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912), 82; 
Catherine Drinker Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia: The Story of the Constitutional Convention May to September 1787 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), 186.
13Calvin C. Jillson, Constitution Making: Conflict and 
Consensus in the Federal Convention (New York: Agatha Press, 
1988), 94: Kenneth R. Bowling, "Politics in the First 
Congress, 1789-91". (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1968), 244.
10
clearly that by the end of the First Session of the Second 
Congress there was a division between the North and the 
South on the apportionment issue. Additionally, the 
Northern states divided between the New England states and 
the Mid-Atlantic states over the apportionment issue. Thus, 
my hypotheses are that by 1792 Northerners and Southerners 
had divided in the House of Representatives along sectional 
lines on the issue of the apportionment of representatives 
in the House of Representatives, with Northerners favoring a 
limited number of representatives in the House and 
Southerners favoring an increase in that body’s size. 
Additionally, within the North two voting blocs emerged: a 
New England bloc that stuck to the extreme Northern view and 
a Mid-Atlantic bloc that occupied something of a middle 
position between New England and the South. These 
hypotheses will be approached through utilization of 
contemporary documents, public debates, private journals, 
and legislative roll call analysis of the House of 
Representatives of the Second Congress.
CHAPTER 2
THE REPRESENTATION DEBATE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
When the Constitutional Convention convened in 
Philadelphia in May 1787, the debate on the apportionment of 
representation in future Congresses was thrust to the fore 
of American politics. Few issues were the subject of more 
debate in the Convention than the question of the states' 
representation in future Congresses. Delegates to the 
Convention struggled throughout the summer with the 
apportionment issue. The North and the South’s concerns 
over their influence in the new Congress and slavery's role 
in apportionment complicated plans to apportion 
representation. Only after protracted debate and eventual 
compromise did the Convention temporarily settle the 
apportionment issue.
The apportionment debate began almost immediately with
the convening of the Constitutional Convention. On 29 May
Edmund Randolph of Virginia submitted fifteen proposals for
consideration to the Convention. Randolph's second
proposition dealt specifically with how to apportion
representation in the new Congress. It read that the
rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to 
be proportional to the quotas of contribution or to the
11
12
number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases.1
On 11 June the Committee of the Whole was prepared to 
debate the details of Randolph's second proposition. The 
Convention had previously agreed on a bicameral legislature 
with a House of Representatives directly elected by the 
people.2 Now the delegates to the Convention had the 
opportunity to elucidate their concerns over the 
apportionment of representatives in that Congress. John 
Rutledge of South Carolina expressed the Southern position. 
He stated that he preferred to see representation 
apportioned according to the states' comparative wealth, 
therefore implying that slave populations would be included 
in all determinations of apportionment. James Wilson of 
Pennsylvania likewise stressed that the Southern states 
deserved additional representatives to account for their 
slave populations. Benjamin Franklin, also of Pennsylvania,
lA complete copy of Randolph’s fifteen propositions, 
also known as the Virginia Resolutions, can be found in Merrill Jensen, ed., Constitutional Documents and Records, 
1776-1787, vol. 1, The Documentary History of the 
Ratification of the Constitution. 16 vols. (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976-1986), 1: 243 (hereinafter cited as Documents).
20n 31 May 1787 the Constitutional Convention agreed on 
a House of Representatives directly elected by the people.
On 9 June the Convention voted in favor of a bicameral 
legislature. Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911- 
37, 4 vols.; reprint, New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1966), 4 vols., 1: 46, 176 (page references are to reprint 
edition, hereinafter cited as Farrand, Records).
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argued the apportionment of representatives should be in 
proportion to each states' number of inhabitants.3 
As the first order of business, Rufus King of 
Massachusetts submitted a resolution to amend Randolph's 
second proposition. King's resolution ruled out 
apportioning representation equally among the states.
Unlike the Articles of Confederation’s fifth article, 
apportionment in future Congresses would be based on 
proportional representation.4 David Brearley of New Jersey, 
speaking in opposition to King, noted that any provision 
denying the states equal representation in the Congress 
would lead to despotism. He flippantly proposed a "new 
division so that each state is equal— then a government on 
the present system will be just."5 Brearley feared that if 
the states were not guaranteed equal representation in the 
Congress, two divergent coalitions of states would emerge: 
the first consisting of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and 
Virginia and the second comprised of the ten other states.
He noted that the total votes of the smaller ten states, 
based on wealth and population, failed to equal the voting 
power of the three most populous states combined.6
3lbid., 1: 204, 205, 197.
4ibid., 1: 192. For the one vote per state provisions 
of the Articles of Confederation, see Documents, 1: 86.
5Farrand, Records, 1: 181-82.
6lbid., 1: 184.
14
Following the passage of King's resolution, Rutledge 
moved to add to it a clause that would have based 
apportionment in the Congress on tax quotas. Rutledge's 
resolution came under attack from the smaller states. 
William Patterson of New Jersey found the new clause 
particularly onerous and asked, "Is a man, for example, 
possessing a property of £4000 to have 40 votes to one 
possessing £ 100?"7 Unable to reach a consensus on 
Rutledge's resolution, the Committee of the Whole postponed 
consideration of it to take up debate on the other major 
issue of controversy surrounding apportionment--slavery.
James Wilson, seconded by C.C. Pinckney of South 
Carolina, introduced an amendment to Rutledge's resolution 
basing representation
in proportion to the whole number of white and other 
free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex and 
condition, including those bound to a servitude for a 
term of years, and three-fifths of all other persons.8
7 Ibid., 1: 182
8ibid., 1: 193. Wilson based his provision on the 
precedent established during debate of the Articles of Confederation in 1783. At that time, it was agreed that all 
expenses incurred for the defense and general welfare of the 
United States would be defrayed from the treasury. The 
treasury would be supported by the states in proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens, including indentured servants, and "three-fifths of all other persons 
not comprehended in the foregoing description. . . ."; see 
also, Jonathan Elliot, ed., The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 2nd 
ed., 5 vols. (Washington: Taylor & Maury, 1866), 1: 95 (hereinafter cited as Elliot, Debates.).
15
On 18 April 1783 the Continental Congress had agreed to the 
"three-fifths" compromise. That clause had settled the 
Congress's argument over slavery's role in the apportionment 
of taxes. Wilson hoped that in 1787 the three-fifths clause 
would again settle a divisive issue.9
Randolph's original resolution had been significantly 
altered by 13 June when Virginia's delegation to the 
Convention introduced the Virginia Plan--its model of the 
new government. Resolution 7 of the Virginia Plan dealt 
specifically with the House of Representatives. It 
encompassed the earlier changes to Randolph's resolution to 
include a statement that representation in the new Congress 
would not be based on the Articles of Confederation's model 
of one vote per state. The Virginia Plan additionally 
incorporated the three-fifths clause and allowed inclusion 
of the South's slave population in the apportionment of 
representatives.10
The delegates from the smaller states and many 
Northerners viewed the Virginia Plan with alarm. The 
provisions providing for proportional representation in the 
Congress and the related three-fifths clause were seen as 
attempts to establish a Southern dominated legislature. 
Luther Martin of Maryland, an eventual opponent of the 
Constitution, echoed Brearley's earlier statement and noted,
9Documents, 1: 86; Elliot, Debates, 1: 95.
lOFarrand, Records.1: 227; Documents, 1: 249.
16
Out of the number 90, Virginia has 16 votes, 
Massachusetts 14, Pennsylvania 12—  in all 42. Add to this a state having four votes, and it gives a majority 
in the general legislature. Conseguently, a combination of these states will govern the remaining nine or ten states.11
The delegates from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 
and Delaware therefore formulated their own plan of 
government. William Patterson of New Jersey presented it to 
the Convention on 15 June. The New Jersey Plan, as it came 
to be known, was based on the model of the Articles of 
Confederation.12 it called for an equal representation 
among the states in a unicameral Congress. Although the New 
Jersey Plan failed to pass the Convention, it did succeed in 
expressing some of the Northern and smaller states' 
opposition to the Virginia Plan. Thereafter, the debate on 
the apportionment issue became increasingly focused on 
attempts to reconcile demands of the South and the large 
states for a legislature based on proportional 
representation with the small states' insistence on a 
legislature in which all states had an equal voice.
The critics of the New Jersey Plan remained committed 
to the Virginia Plan. By mid-June the Convention had 
divided into two factions. The supporters of the New Jersey 
Plan stressed the threats of the large states' dictating to 
the Congress. Meanwhile, Alexander Hamilton, speaking for
llFarrand, Records, 1: 440.
12pocuments, 1: 250; Farrand, Records, 3: 612.
17
the supporters of the Virginia Plan and against his fellow 
delegates from New York, noted,
Another destructive ingredient in the [New Jersey] plan, is that eguality of suffrage which is so much desired by 
the small States. It is not in human nature that Va. &
the large states should consent to it, of if they did
that they shd. long abide by it. It shocks too much the ideas of Justice, and every human feeling.13
The Virginia and New Jersey Plans reached a vote on 19
June. By a vote of seven states in favor, three against,
and one divided, the Convention agreed not to accept the
provisions of the New Jersey Plan and instead to continue
debate on the Virginia Plan. As a result, the provisions of
the Virginia Plan once again had to be put before the
Committee of the Whole. The Convention repeated its earlier
vote in favor of a bicameral legislature in which the Senate
was elected by the state legislatures. Additionally, on 29
June it voted in favor of establishing a different suffrage
from that of the Articles of Confederation, which provided
only one vote per state.14
By 1 July the Convention was deadlocked on the
representation issue. In an attempt to reach some common
ground, the Convention had postponed future debate on
representation in the House and instead focused on
representation in the Senate. On 2 July, in a close vote,
the Convention voted five states for, five against, and one
divided on a proposal for equal representation in the
13ibid., 1: 286.
14ibid., 1: 313, 353-54, 397, 461.
18
Senate. Realizing that the question of the apportionment of 
representatives in the Congress had brought the Convention's 
proceedings to a standstill, the Committee of the Whole 
agreed to submit the representation question to a committee 
comprised of one member from each state.15
The Grand Committee convened on 2 July. The central 
question facing it was how the larger states would be 
prevented from dictating the government without being 
subjugated to the will of the smaller states. Three days 
later the Grand Committee submitted its report to the 
Committee of the Whole. Its recommendation called for an 
equal representation of all the states in the Senate and 
proportional representation in the House based on a 
representation of one representative for every forty 
thousand persons of each state. Additionally, each state 
would have at least one member in the House of 
Representatives if its total population were below forty 
thousand.16
Although the principle seemed sound, the Convention 
could not agree on the Grand Committee's suggestion of a 
representation ratio of one to forty thousand. Rutledege
15The Grand Committee consisted of Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, Robert Yates 
of New York, William Patterson of New Jersey, Benjamin 
Franklin of Pennsylvania, Gunning Bedford of Delaware,
Luther Martin of Maryland, George Mason of Virginia, William 
Richardson Davie of North Carolina, John Rutledge of South 
Carolina, and Abraham Baldwin of Georgia. Ibid., 1: 509.
16ibid., 1: 542.
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proposed a change to the Grand Committee's report that would 
have fixed apportionment on each state's proportional 
contribution to taxes rather than on population. On 6 July, 
after it became clear that debate on the representation 
ratio had brought the Convention's proceedings to yet 
another standstill, the representation ratio was submitted 
to another special committee. That committee, comprised of 
Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, Nathaniel Gorham of 
Massachusetts, Randolph, Rutledge, and King, was to debate 
the representation ratio specifically. Meanwhile, on 7 
July, while Morris's committee debated, the Convention once 
again agreed on egual representation in the Senate.17 
Although the Convention had agreed to equal 
representation in the Senate, the central issue of the 
representation debate remained unsettled. The Convention 
was unable to reach a consensus on how to apportion 
representation in the House of Representatives. On both 9 
and 10 July Morris's committee submitted proposals to the 
Committee of the Whole. Both those plans involved setting 
the number of representatives in the First House at a fixed 
number and called for a census to provide information for an 
apportionment of representatives at a later date. After 
motions by the North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia 
delegates to increase the respective apportionment in the
549 .
l^Elliot, Debates, 1: 194; Farrand, Records, 1: 538,
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new Congress failed, the Convention took up the census as 
its new focus of debate.18
The representation ratio debate was therefore preempted 
by the census debate for two days. On 11 and 12 July the 
Convention debated the frequency of the census.
From the Morris committee’s original proposal of a census in 
fifteen years, the Convention finally agreed to conducting 
one within six years of the government's formation and one 
every ten years thereafter. Representation, meanwhile, 
would be apportioned in accordance with a constitutional 
mandate prior to the first census. The significant 
provision of the census compromise was to base the census on 
both the states' free inhabitants and slave population, 
utilizing the three-fifths clause.19
After the census debate the representation issue again 
appeared stuck at a standstill. The Committee of the Whole 
agreed to reconsider the Grand Committee's original report. 
But before that report could be read, Elbridge Gerry of 
Massachusetts offered a new resolution to the Convention. 
Hoping to alert the Convention to the political threat 
poised by the country's rapidly increasing western 
population, he submitted the following proposition:
That to secure the liberties of the States already 
Confederated, the number of representatives in the first 
branch from the States which shall hereafter be 
established, shall never exceed the representatives from
18ibid., 1: 557, 563.
19lbid., 1: 576, 590; Elliot, Debates, 1: 91.
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such of the thirteen United States as shall acceded to this Confederation.20
Although Gerry’s proposition was defeated, it was indicative 
of the Eastern states' concerns that under a system of 
proportional representation their influence in the national 
government would eventually be surpassed by the rapidly 
expanding population on the frontier.
By mid July it was understood among the delegates that 
the Convention’s work was nearly complete except for an 
agreement on the apportionment issue. Rumblings were even 
heard that if an acceptable compromise on the representation 
issue could not be reached it would become necessary to 
dissolve the Convention. Realizing the imminent threat to 
the Constitution's future, the Committee of the Whole, on 16 
July, reached a quasi-compromise. The Grand Committee's 
report was amended to include a provision to provide for 
sixty-five members in the First Congress and to conduct a 
census within six years of the Congress's convening. 
Representation would subsequently be apportioned according 
to that census. Additionally, the three-fifths clause would 
be incorporated into the Constitution for apportionment and 
taxation purposes.21
The compromise of 16 July was no breakthrough; no 
issues were actually settled. It was merely a postponement 
of the apportionment debate until it could be settled in the
20Farrand, Records, 2: 1.
2lElliot, Debates, 1: 205-06; Farrand, Records, 2: 7, 
14-15.
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Committee of Detail, the body directly responsible for the 
writing of the Constitution.
The Committee of Detail, consisting of Rutledge,
Wilson, Randolph, Gorham, and Oliver Ellsworth of 
Connecticut presented its first Draft Constitution to the 
Convention on 6 August. It set the number of 
representatives in the First House at sixty-five members and 
established a representation ratio of one representative for 
each forty thousand persons on which to apportion 
representation when the country's population increased. 
However, it contained neither provisions for the three- 
fifths clause nor the specifics of a census on which to 
apportion representation at a later date.22
On 8 August the Convention debated the Draft 
Constitution. Provisions to allow each state at least one 
representative were immediately added to the proposed 
Constitution. An attempt to insert a clause allowing only 
free citizens to be counted for apportionment purposes and 
therefore negating the three-fifths clause was defeated.
But more importantly, it was agreed that representation 
would be allotted according to taxation. On 9 August the 
Committee of the Whole agreed to the above changes to the 
Draft Constitution.23
22ibid., 4: 221; Elliot, Debates, 1: 224; Farrand, 
Records, 2: 78; Documents, 1: 261.
23Elliot, Debates, 5: 388.
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The debate over the apportionment issue temporarily 
ended when the amendments to the Draft Constitution were 
submitted to the Committee of Detail. From 9 August until 
14 September the Convention debated the Draft Constitution's 
other provisions. But on 14 September the apportionment 
debate was revived. Hugh Williamson of North Carolina 
submitted a motion to increase the number of Representatives 
in the House to over one hundred and to therefore guarantee 
the smaller states at least two representatives. After that 
motion failed, another was submitted on 15 September to 
increase North Carolina’s share of representation in the 
First Congress. When that motion failed, the Convention 
undertook discussion of the revised Draft Constitution.24 
On 17 September the Committee of Detail submitted a 
significantly altered Draft Constitution to the Convention 
for its approval. The revised Constitution incorporated all 
the points of the debate enumerated during the Convention.
In a guid-pro-quo for the small states' equal representation 
in the Senate, it provided for proportional representation 
in the House of Representatives. That proportional 
representation, along with taxes, would be based on the 
states' free populations and three-fifths of their slave 
populations. The new Constitution also called for a census 
within three years of the first meeting of the Congress. 
After that census, representation would be apportioned in
24 ibid., 5: 541, 547.
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the House at a ratio of not more than one representative for 
each thirty thousand inhabitants of each state--an increase 
in the total number of representatives from the original 
proposal of one representative for each forty thousand 
persons. Additionally, each state was also guaranteed at 
least one representative out of a total of sixty-five in the 
First House.25
On 17 September all the remaining members of the 
Convention, except Randolph, Mason, and Gerry, agreed to and 
signed the Constitution.26 From there, the Constitution and 
the apportionment issue went to the states for debate and 
ratification.
25pocuments, 1: 286.
26Elliot, Debates, 5: 559-65.
CHAPTER 3
PUBLIC ARGUMENTS AND THE REPRESENTATION DEBATE
After the Convention approved the Constitution, the 
representation debate was centered in the states. The 
Constitution had established a representation ratio of not 
more than one representative for each thirty thousand 
persons until an apportionment could be made following the 
first census. Until that apportionment could be completed, 
the Congress would consists of sixty-five members.1 Leading 
up to and during the state ratification conventions, the 
size of the House of Representatives became the topic of
lConstitution, art. I, sec. 2. The actual 
apportionment provisions of the Constitution read:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned 
among the several States which may be included within 
this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which 
shall be determined by adding the whole Number of free 
Persons, including those bound to a Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths 
of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be 
made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such manner as they 
shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives 
shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until 
such enumeration shall be made, the State of New 
Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three,Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence 
Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New 
Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland 
six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina 
five, and Georgia three.
25
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spirited public debate between the supporters and the 
critics of the Constitution.
The Anti-Federalist critics of the Constitution used 
its apportionment clause to question the validity of the 
entire Constitution. They argued first that sixty-five 
members in the House inadequately represented the mass of 
the American people, and second, a representation ratio of 
not more than one to thirty thousand would lead to too few 
representatives after the apportionment. They warned that 
if the House membership remained small, it would evolve 
quickly into a corruptible ruling aristocracy. And as a 
final caveat, they contended that the United States was too 
large a nation to have only one representative for each 
thirty thousand persons in the national legislature.
The Constitution's supporters, particularly James 
Madison and Alexander Hamilton, answered the Anti- 
Federalists in The Federalist Papers. The Federalists 
contended that a limited representation in the House of 
Representatives was the best guarantee of American 
republicanism and liberties. They noted that the history of 
republics, particularly Athens and Rome, showed that as 
representative bodies grew in size, the more unwieldily they 
became. As those bodies increased, they were ruled by 
demagogues supported by the "tyranny of the majority." 
Therefore, if the number of representatives were increased, 
the House of Representatives would use its influence with
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the masses to usurp the powers of the executive and 
judiciary.
Both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists 
understood that the representation issue would be a deciding 
factor in the Constitution's ratification. They agreed that 
"the object of every free government is the public good, and 
all lesser interests yield to it."2 They determined that 
the proper size of the House of Representatives should 
therefore be settled in the ratifying conventions. James 
Madison, in The Federalist 55, wrote, "The true question to 
be decided then is whether the smallness of the number, as a 
temporary regulation, be dangerous to the public liberty."3
The Anti-Federalists began their attacks on the 
Constitution's apportionment clause almost immediately after 
the Constitutional Convention's adjournment. They noted 
that the Convention had intended the House of 
Representatives to serve as the vox populi. However, it was 
too restricted in size to serve the people's interests 
adequately. As one opponent of the Constitution noted, for
2"Brutus IV," 29 November 1787, in Herbert J. Storing, 
ed., The Complete Anti-Federalist, 7 vols. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1981), 2: 382 (hereinafter cited as Anti-Federalist).
3"Strictures on the Proposed Constitution" from 
Philadelphia Freeman's Journal, 26 September 1787, John P. Kaminski and others, eds., Commentaries on the Constitution: 
Public and Private, vols. 13-16 of The Documentary History 
of the Ratification of the Constitution, 16 vols., ed. 
Merrill Jensen (Madison: State Historical Society of 
Wisconsin, 1976-1986), 13: 244 (hereinafter cited as 
Commentaries); Publius, The Federalist 55, from New York 
Independent Journal. 13 February 1788, ibid., 16: 113.
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government to serve the people, the people must have a voice 
in the body responsible for making the laws by which they 
were to be governed.4 Other Anti-Federalists argued that 
the lower classes, particularly farmers, laborers, and small 
merchants, would be unrepresented in the Congress. "Cato" 
suggested to his readers that few of them would have the 
opportunity to serve in the House of Representatives.
Thomas Tudor Tucker wrote to St. George Tucker that the 
House of Representatives would offer only a nominal 
representation of the people, while "Brutus" wrote that
The great body of yeoman of the country cannot expect 
any of their order in the assembly,. . . there is no
probability that a farmer, however respectable, will be 
chosen--the mechanicks of every branch must expect to be 
excluded from a seat in this Body.5
However, the Federalist authors of the Constitution 
argued that the House of Representatives adeguately 
represented the people. One Federalist described the House 
of Representatives as a "truly popular assembly."6 Another
4"Brutus IV," 29 November 1787, Anti-Federalist, 2:382 .
5"The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to their 
Constituents" from Pennsylvania Packet. 18 December 1787, 
Commentaries, 15: 26-27; "Cato V," Anti-Federalist, 2: 119; 
Thomas Tudor Tucker to St. George Tucker, 28 December 1787, 
Commentaries. 15: 144; "Brutus III," 15 November 1787, Anti- 
Federalist , 2: 381.
6"An American Citizen III: On the Federal Government" 
from Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, 29 September 1787, 
Commentaries, 13: 272; see also Edmund Pendelton to James 
Madison, 8 October 1787, William T. Hutchinson and others, 
eds., The Papers of James Madison. 17 vols.
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1962- ), 10: 
354 (hereinafter cited as Madison).
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Federalist contended that the House of Representatives would 
"especially resemble the great body of the people."7 in The 
Federalist 57, Madison argued that the Constitution's 
provisions reguiring that members of the House be elected 
every two years tied each representative closely to his 
constituents' interests. "Who," he asked, "are to be the 
electors of the Federal Representatives? . . . The electors 
are to be the great body of the people of the United 
States."8
Alexander Hamilton was an ardent supporter of the 
Constitution's apportionment provisions. In The Federalist 
35 he wrote,
The idea of an actual representation of all classes of 
the people by persons of each class is altogether 
visionary. Mechanicks and manufacturers will always be 
inclined with few exceptions to give their votes to 
merchants in preference to persons of their own professions or trades.9
The leaders of the new government, the landed gentry, 
merchants, and educated professionals, would therefore have 
the masses’ sanction to represent them in the Congress. 
Madison acknowledged that the upper classes' interests would 
not necessarily coincide with those of the lower classes, 
but "a coalition of a majority of the whole society could
7publius, The Federalist 22, from New York Packet, 14 December 1787, Commentaries, 14: 444.
8publius, The Federalist 57, from New York Packet, 19 
February 1788, ibid., 16: 145.
9publius, The Federalist 35, from New York Independent 
Journal, 5 January 1788, ibid., 15: 270.
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seldom take place on any other principle than those of 
justice and the general good."10
Other arguments were offered against a dramatic 
increase in the size of the House of Representatives. One 
Federalist suggested that an increase in the number of 
representatives would place too heavy of a tax burden on the 
common man. Additionally, in The Federalist 58, Madison 
questioned if the rewards of demanding that more 
representatives serve in the House were worth the costs. He 
wrote: "the larger the number, the greater will be the 
proportion of members limited in information and of weak 
capacities."11
Both the supporters of the Constitution and its critics 
argued that the American people demanded men possessing 
virtue and integrity as their representatives. However, the 
Anti-Federalist doubted that such a sense of noblesse oblige 
was present in most American statesmen. They feared that if 
the size of the House of Representatives were not increased, 
an aristocratic clique would emerge in the Congress that 
would combine with the executive and judiciary to enrich 
themselves at the people's expense. One Anti-Federalist
lOpublius, The Federalist 36, from New York Packet, 8 
January 1788, ibid., 15: 302; Publius, The Federalist 51, 
from New York Independent Journal, 6 February 1788, ibid., 
16: 46.
11"A Landholder IV" from Connecticut Courant, 26 
December 1787, ibid., 14: 253; Publius, The Federalist 58, 
from New York Independent Journal, 20 February 1788, ibid., 16: 157.
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wrote: "In every civilized community, even those of the most 
democratic kind, there are principles which lead to an 
aristocracy--there are superior talents, fortunes and 
employments.12 it was therefore the founding fathers' 
responsibility to assure that the legislature was incapable 
of becoming a quasi House of Lords.
The Anti-Federalist claimed an increase in the number 
of representatives in the House would arrest the growth of 
an aristocracy. They assumed a legislature limited in size 
to only sixty-five members was bound to become corrupted by 
aristocrats. And although those same Anti-Federalists 
anticipated significant growth in the country's population 
over time and the admission of new states, they feared that 
the limited size of the First House still poised the threat 
of an aristocracy. Richard Henry Lee therefore proposed to 
Edmund Randolph that if the number of representatives were 
increased in the first few Congresses, corruption in the 
House would be controlled. In "Brutus'" estimation, "The 
firmest [sic] security against this kind of improper and 
dangerous influence, as well as all other, is a strong and 
numerous representation. . . ."13
12"Foreign Spectator" from Pennsylvania Independent Gazetteer, 2 October 1787, ibid., 13: 291; "George Mason, 
Objections to the Constitution," 7 October 1787, ibid., 13: 
348; "Cato IV" from New York Journal. 13 December 1787, ibid., 14: 431.
13Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph, 6 December 
1787, ibid., 14: 368; "Brutus IV" from ibid., 14: 298-99.
32
The Federalist supporters of the Constitution argued 
differently. For the Federalists, the most basic threat to 
republican government was not an aristocratic clique, but 
the tumult of the masses. In The Federalist 55, Madison 
wrote,
In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters 
composed, passion never fails to unrest the scepter from 
reason. Had every Athenian been a Socrates; every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.14
In both The Federalist 51 and The Federalist 49. Madison and 
Hamilton warned that republican government must not only 
guard against oppression by tyrannical rulers, but also 
against the tyranny of the majority. An increase in the 
size of the House would only lead to a demagogic Congress 
that usurped the power of the executive and the judiciary. 
Madison, in The Federalist 48, warned that "the legislative 
department is everywhere extending the sphere of its 
activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous 
vortex."15
Although several Anti-Federalists saw a plot to create 
an aristocracy, Federalist authors doubted that those 
elected to the House of Representatives would desire to
14publius, The Federalist 55. from New York Independent Journal. 13 February 1788, ibid., 16: 112.
15publius, The Federalist 51, from New York Independent 
Journal, 6 February 1788, ibid., 16: 46; Publius, The 
Federalist 49. from New York Independent Journal. 2 February 
1788, ibid., 16: 18; Publius, The Federalist 48 from New 
York Packet, 1 February 1788, ibid., 16: 4; see also Edmund 
Pendleton to James Madison, 8 October 1787, Madison, 10:188.
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create a ruling elite dedicated to oppressing the masses.
In The Federalist 55, Madison contended that it was unlikely 
that the American people "will chuse, and every second year 
repeat the choice of sixty-five or an hundred men, who would 
be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or 
treachery."16
The Federalists prided themselves on their 
understanding of man's political nature. And while they 
acknowledged that there were factors in human nature that 
led to inequalities in men's abilities, those factors also 
suggested that some men were more capable of ruling than 
others. As such, the Anti-Federalist Mercy Otis Warren 
inadvertently described the Federalist position when she 
wrote:
Every age has its Bruiti and its Decii, as well as its Caesars and Sejani . . . America may yet produce
characters who have a genius and capacity sufficient to 
form the manners and correct the morals of the people, and virtue enough to lead their country to freedom.17
The Anti-Federalist also contended that the size of the 
United States should have an impact on the number of 
Representatives apportioned in the House. They argued that 
republicanism could not survive in a country as large as the 
United States. As students of Montesquieu's Spirit of the 
Laws, they assumed that it was natural for a republic to
16publius, The Federalist 55, from New York Independent 
Journal, 13 February 1788, ibid., 16: 113.
17"A Columbian Patriot: Observations of the
Constitution" ibid., 16: 288.
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flourish only in a small territory. "Brutus" argued that a 
free republic could not succeed in a country as large as the 
United States. He contended that to limit the size of the 
House of Representatives would only lead to a widely spread 
populace without proper representation. He argued that no 
practical number of representatives could be found to 
represent adequately the interests and sentiments of the 
citizens of such a vast continent. "An Old Whig IV" stated: 
"The continent of the North-America can no more be governed 
by one Republic, than the fabled Atlas could support the 
heavens."18
Luther Martin was a vocal critic of the Constitution.
He stated that the people of the United States were too 
separated by large distances for republicanism to extend to 
them. With only sixty-five members in the House of 
Representatives, it was unlikely that all the varying 
interests would have a voice in the Congress. Mercy Otis 
Warren similarly noted,
The difficulty, if not impracticability of exercising the equal and equitable powers of government by a single 
legislature over an extent of territory . . . is a
18"Cato III" from New York Independent Journal, 25 October 1787, ibid., 13: 474; "Letters from the Federal 
Farmer to the Republican," 8 October 1787, Anti-Federalist, 
2: 230; "Centinel III" from Pennsylvania Independent 
Gazetteer, 8 November 1787, Commentaries, 14: 61; "Brutus 
III" from New York Journal, 15 November 1787, ibid., 14: 119; "The Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania 
Convention" from Pennsylvania Packet, 18 December 1787, ibid., 15: 26; "Curtipolis" from New York Daily Advertiser, 
18 January 1788, ibid., 15: 400; "An Old Whig IV" from 
Pennsylvania Independent Gazetteer, 27 October 1787, ibid., 13: 500.
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inseparable objection to the adoption of the new system.19
Madison, in The Federalist 56, answered the Anti- 
Federalist argument that the United States was too large a 
nation for republicanism to reach all its citizens. He 
argued that the common body of representatives would have 
access to the knowledge of each district's representatives: 
"Whilst a few representatives therefore from each state may 
bring with them a due knowledge of their own state, every 
representative will have much information to acquire 
concerning all the other states."20 However, to insist that 
each representative be knowledgeable of every minute detail 
concerning each group's interests was unreasonable. In the 
same essay, Madison wrote that "an ignorance of minute and 
particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of 
legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to 
a due performance of the legislative truths."21
The debate surrounding the size of the House of 
Representatives would continue even after the Constitution's 
ratification in 1788. The critics of the apportionment 
clause refused to accept that the number of representatives 
in the House would remain small. Even Madison, after he had
19"Luther Martin: Genuine Information XI" from 
Baltimore Maryland Gazette, 5 February 1788, ibid., 16: 40; 
"A Columbian Patriot: Observation of the Constitution" 
ibid., 16: 282.
20publius, The Federalist 56. in New York Independent 
Journal, 16 February 1788, ibid., 16: 131.
21Publius, The Federalist 56, in New York Independent 
Journal. 16 February 1788, ibid., 16: 130.
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helped secure the Constitution's ratification through the 
authorship of The Federalist Papers, abandoned Hamilton and 
argued for an immediate increase in the size of the House. 
Madison's efforts to placate the Anti-Federalists' arguments 
against a House of Representatives limited in size virtually- 
assured that the representation issue would be debated in 
the First Congress.
CHAPTER 4
THE FIRST CONGRESS AND THE APPORTIONMENT AMENDMENT
The ratification debates in the states indicated that 
many Americans were opposed to the Constitution. One 
particular point of contention was the Constitution’s clause 
apportioning representation in the House of Representatives. 
And while opposition to that clause was not significant 
enough to prevent ratification of the Constitution, it 
became the subject of several proposed constitutional 
amendments in the state ratifying conventions.
Pennsylvania's ratifying convention was the first body 
to suggest that the Constitution's apportionment clause was 
flawed. The Pennsylvania convention voted to ratify the 
Constitution on 12 December 1787 by a vote of forty-six to 
twenty-three. However, the convention's sizable minority 
suggested fifteen amendments in "The Address and Reasons of 
Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of 
Pennsylvania to Their Constitution, 1787." Those amendments 
were intended to provide the American people with a bill of 
rights guaranteeing their liberties. The tenth amendment 
dealt specifically with the apportionment of representatives 
in the House of Representatives. In a guarantee that the 
selection of representatives would remain free, the 
Pennsylvania minority's amendment read, "That the house of
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representatives be properly increased in number."1 The 
Pennsylvania minority argued that the sixty-five members 
scheduled to comprise the House under the Constitution were 
inadequate. They contended that the American people's 
liberties, interests, and happiness would be dependent upon 
the views of a body of representatives too small to 
represent them fully and too prone to the chief executive's 
influence.2
There was also opposition to the Constitution's 
apportionment clause in the Massachusetts ratifying 
convention. While it is not known whether the Massachusetts 
delegates were directly influenced by the Pennsylvania 
minority, nine amendments were proposed to the Constitution 
in the convention’s notification of ratification on 6 
February 1788. Like the Pennsylvania minority's tenth 
amendment, the Massachusetts convention's second amendment 
referred to the apportionment of representatives in the 
House. In an effort to increase the size of the House, 
Massachusetts proposed "That there shall be one 
representative to every thirty thousand persons, according
l"The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of 
the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to their 
Constituents" from Pennsylvania Packet. 18 December 1787, 
John P. Kaminski and others, eds., Commentaries on the 
Constitution; Public and Private, vols. 13-16 of The 
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, 
16 vols., ed. Merrill Jensen (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976-1986), 15: 26 (hereinafter cited 
as Commentaries).
2 Ibid.
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to the census mentioned in the Constitution, until the whole 
number of representatives amounts to two hundred."3
Four months later, the New Hampshire convention 
ratified the Constitution. As the ninth state to do so, it 
brought the Constitution into effect according to the terms 
of the seventh article. But in its ratification message of 
21 June 1788, the convention submitted twelve Constitutional 
amendments. The first nine were taken almost verbatim from 
those of Massachusetts. In the New Hampshire list the 
second amendment was an apportionment proposal that was 
identical to the one submitted by Massachusetts.4
Although the Constitution came into effect with New 
Hampshire's ratification, the largest and most influential 
state, Virginia, had failed to ratify it. Like their 
counterparts in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New 
Hampshire, the opponents of the Constitution in Virginia 
demanded that it be amended to provide the people with a 
bill of rights. On 27 June the Virginia convention 
acquiesced to those demands and agreed to propose twenty 
constitutional amendments, including an apportionment 
amendment. Whereas the Pennsylvania minority's amendment 
had called for an increase in the number of representatives
3Massachusetts Convention Debates, 1788, Bernard 
Schwartz and others, eds., The Bill of Rights: A Documentary 
History, 2 vols. (New York: Chelsa House Publishing, 1971), 2: 713 (hereinafter cited as Bill of Rights).
4New Hampshire Proposed Amendments, 1788, ibid., 2:
760.
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in the House, and Massachusetts and New Hampshire suggested 
a representation ratio of one to thirty thousand until the 
number of representatives reached two hundred, Virginia's 
second amendment combined both those suggestions into one 
proposal. It read:
That there shall be one representative for every thirty 
thousand according to the enumeration or census in the 
Constitution until the whole number of representatives 
amounts to two hundred; after which, the number shall be continued or increased, as Congress shall direct, upon 
the principle fixed in the Constitution, by apportioning 
representatives of each state to some greater number, from time to time, as population increases.5
Opposition to the Constitution’s apportionment clause
continued in the New York ratifying convention. In its
ratification message of 26 July 1788, the New York
convention proposed an apportionment amendment as the first
of thirty-two possible amendments. George Mason claimed
that New York's amendments were modeled on those he had
helped draft in the Virginia convention, and as evidence of
his claim, the two proposals were almost verbatim, with only
one minor difference. New York's amendment stated that once
the number of representatives was increased, that number
"shall be continued or encreased but not diminished."6
The North Carolina ratification convention assembled in
July 1788. That convention voted neither to ratify nor
reject the Constitution. However, in keeping with the other
5virginia Ratifying Convention, 1788, ibid., 2: 842-43.
6For reference to Mason's letter, see ibid., 2: 855;
New York Proposed Amendments, 1788, ibid., 2: 915.
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opponents of the Constitution, it issued a "Declaration of 
Rights" and suggested twenty-six amendments to be added to 
the Constitution when eventually ratified. Virginia's 
amendments had an obvious influence on those of North 
Carolina. In fact, North Carolina's second amendment was an 
exact copy of Virginia's apportionment amendment.7
Before the First Congress convened in March 1789, James 
Madison considered the significance of the amendments 
proposed in the state ratifying conventions. Pennsylvania, 
Massachusetts, Maryland, South Carolina, New Hampshire, 
Virginia, New York, and North Carolina had all proposed 
amendments to the Constitution. Of those states, six, 
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia, New 
York, and North Carolina, had proposed apportionment 
amendments. Madison determined that a list of 
constitutional amendments should therefore be proposed in 
the First Congress. In a tract composed for his campaign 
for election to the House of Representatives, Madison 
stated:
It is my wish, particularly, to see specific provision 
made on the subject of the Rights of Conscience, the 
Freedom of the Press, Trials by Jury, Exemption from 
General Warrants, &c, to see effective provision made 
also for the periodical increase of the representatives, until the number shall amount to the fullest security.8
7North Carolina Convention Debates, 1788, ibid., 2:
915.
8james Madison to a Resident of Spotslyvania County, 27 
January, William T. Hutchinson and others, eds., The Papers 
of James Madison, 17 vols. (Charlotesville: University Press of Virginia, 1962- ), 11: 428 (hereinafter cited as 
Madison) . **
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To Thomas Mann Randolph he suggested that the Constitution 
should be amended to include the Anti-Federalist position 
that the number of representatives should be increased, and 
to secure the Federalist argument that the total number of 
representatives would eventually be limited. He wrote:
I think also that periodical increase of the House of 
Representatives, until it attains a certain number, 
ought to be expressly provided for, instead of being left to the direction of the government.9
Madison realized that the burden of submitting those 
amendments to the Constitution would rest on him. More 
pressing issues would face the First Congress when it 
convened; the United States had no machinery for the 
collection of taxes, no federal judiciary, and virtually no 
army. But after sifting througn a collection of the two 
hundred plus proposed amendments submitted by the states, he 
wrote to Thomas Jefferson on 17 October 1789 that he had 
completed a list of amendments declaring the most basic 
rights.10
Madison got the opportunity to prepare the House of 
Representatives to receive those amendments. George 
Washington asked him to assist in the writing of the first
9james Madison to Thomas Mann Randolph, 13 January 1789, ibid., 11: 416; Madison also wrote to George Eve on 2 January 1789 that "the Constitution ought to be revised, and 
that the first Congress meeting under it ought to prepare 
and recommend to the states for ratification, the most 
satisfactory provisions for all essential rights. . . . "  ibid., 11: 405.
lOjames Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 17 October 1789, ibid., 11: 297.
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inaugural address. In that address, on 30 April 1789, the 
President reminded the Congress that several state ratifying 
conventions had called for amendments to the Constitution. 
But, the President noted, "Instead of undertaking particular 
recommendations on this subject . . .  I shall give way to my 
entire confidence in your [the Congress's] discernment and 
pursuit of the public good."11
Madison also drafted the House reply to Washington's
inaugural address. In response to Washington's suggestion
that the Congress prepare a list of amendments to the
Constitution, Madison wrote that
the question arising out of the fifth article of the 
Constitution, will receive all the attention demanded by 
its importance; and will, we trust, be decided, under 
the influence of all the consideration to which you 
allude.12
On 25 May 1789, the day the First House had scheduled 
to begin discussion of amendments, the Committee of the 
Whole agreed to postpone consideration of any constitutional 
amendments until 8 June. Madison noted that prior to 25 May 
very little had been mentioned privately or publicly in the 
Congress regarding amendments to the Constitution. Research 
in contemporary newspapers also showed that the topic of 
proposed constitutional amendments received virtually no 
mention. From April through late May the members of the
llJames D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages 
and the Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, 20 vols. 
(Washington: GPO, 1897), 1: 53.
12Gazette of the United States. 2 May 1789.
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House had focused on what they considered to be the more 
pressing issues of establishing a means of revenue for the 
federal government and the organization of the executive 
branch.13
Finally, on 8 June, Madison submitted his nineteen 
amendments to the Committee of the Whole. Twelve days 
earlier he had written to Jefferson to tell him that a "Bill 
of rights, incorporated perhaps into the Constitution will 
be proposed, with few alterations most called for by the 
opponents of the Government and least objectionable to its 
friends."14
Madison's reasons for submitting the amendments to the 
Constitution were based on more than politics. Although he 
had originally been one of the Constitution's most ardent 
supporters, he realized that it was not a perfect document. 
And although his primary purpose was to prove that the 
Federalist supporters of the Constitution were friends of 
liberty, he hoped the amendments would also remove those 
sections of the Constitution he felt to be iniquitous—  
namely the lack of a Bill of Rights. Additionally, by
13ibid., 27 May 1789.
14james Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 13 Jun 1789, 
Madison, 12: 218; Madison wrote several associates to tell 
them of his plan to submit a list of amendments to The Constitution. He noted in all those letters that he was not 
proposing any amendment that was too controversial to pass 
two-thirds of the Congress and three-fourths of the states. 
See James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 21 June 1789, ibid., 
12: 272; James Madison to George Nicholas, 5 July 1789, 
ibid., 12: 282.
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amending the Constitution, Madison hoped to encourage Rhode 
Island and North Carolina to ratify and join the Union. And 
last, and his most significant contribution to the 
constitutional debate, he felt that his nineteen amendments 
would strengthen the Constitution for later generations.15
Madison's second amendment dealt specifically with the 
Constitution's representation ratio. The Constitution's 
first article, second section, third clause, established a 
representation ratio of not more than one representative for 
every thirty thousand persons until a reapportionment could 
be made following the Census of 1790. Madison proposed 
amending that clause to read:
After the first actual enumeration, there shall be one 
Representative for every thirty thousand, until the
number amounts to _____, after which the proportion
shall be so regulated that the number shall never be
less than _____, nor more than _____, but each State
shall, after the first enumeration, have at least two 
Representatives; and prior thereto.16
He assumed that during debate the Committee of the Whole
would insert the number in the blanks acceptable to most
representatives.
The nation's press duly reported the submission of 
Madison's amendments. But unfortunately, no analysis of 
those amendments was offered. However, we must remember 
that the apportionment amendment was just one of many
15Notes for Speech in Congress, ca. 8 June 1789, ibid., 
12: 193-95.
16pebates and Proceedings of the Congress of the United 
States, 1789-1824 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834-56),
42 vols. 1: 434 (hereinafter cited as Annals of Congress).
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amendments. Perhaps it was felt that there were too many 
amendments to discuss in the press or that they were best 
left in the care of the House of Representatives.
The House returned to Madison's apportionment proposal 
on 21 July. On 15 June, Madison had written to Edmund 
Randolph to note, "The article which I fear most for is that 
which respects representation."17 And while debate in the 
House had focused on the whole range of Madison's eighteen 
other amendments, no finalized version of those amendments 
had been agreed to in the House. The Committee of the Whole 
therefore formed a committee comprised of one member from 
each state to prepare a final list of amendments for 
submittal to the states. The Committee of Eleven, as it 
became known, consisted of Madison, John Vining of Delaware, 
Abraham Baldwin of Georgia, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, 
Aedanus Burke of South Carolina, Nicholas Gilman of New 
Hampshire, George Clymer of Pennsylvania, Egbert Benson of 
New York, Benjamin Goodhue of Massachusetts, Elias Boudinot 
of New Jersey, and George Gale of Maryland. Seven days 
later the committee made its report to the Committee of the 
Whole.18
On 14 August the House considered the Committee of 
Eleven's amendments to the Constitution. The committee had 
proposed seventeen amendments; the second was an
17James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 15 June 1789, 
Madison. 12: 219.
18Gazette of the United States, 19 August 1789.
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apportionment amendment. Similar to Madison's original 
proposal, it would have revised the Constitution's 
representation ratio to read,
after the first enumeration, there shall be one 
representative for every thirty thousand, until the 
number shall amount to one hundred. After which the 
proportion shall be so regulated by Congress that the number of representatives shall never be less than one 
hundred, nor more than one hundred and seventy five; but 
each state shall always have at least one representative.19
The committee's apportionment amendment incorporated 
all the suggestions of the apportionment amendments proposed 
by the states. Virginia and North Carolina's amendments can 
been seen as the logical model for the new amendment. It 
included the Anti-Federalist and the Pennsylvania minority's 
suggestion that the number of representatives in the House 
be increased. As for the Federalists, the amendment 
included Massachusetts and New Hampshire's recommendation 
that the number of representatives should be limited at a 
fixed number. New York's suggestion that once the increase 
in the number of representatives was made that at no point 
should it be decreased was also incorporated into the new 
amendment.
The committee's amendment, like Madison's earlier 
amendment, would have significantly increased the number of 
representatives in the House. Although the First Census had 
yet to be completed, it was assumed that the House, if the 
amendment passed, would be increased to over one hundred
l^Annals of Congress, 1: 719.
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members. As early as the Confederation period, it was 
acknowledged that the population of the United States was 
over three million persons. With three million inhabitants, 
representation in the House would be increased and 
reapportioned among the states.
In a preview of later debate in the Second Congress, 
the Committee of the Whole took that increase and 
reapportionment as the focus of its debate. Vining, one of 
the leaders of the apportionment debate in both the First 
and Second Congresses, unsuccessfully moved to guarantee 
each state at least two representatives if its total 
population amounted to forty-five thousand persons.20 
Fisher Ames of Massachusetts then proposed increasing the 
representation ratio in the amendment to one representative 
for each forty thousand persons.
Ames hoped that by increasing the representation ratio
/he could limit the increase in the size of the House. 
Although that increase was inevitable, the Federalists still 
hoped to control its size. Ames therefore presented three 
arguments against a radical increase in the number of 
representatives in the House. First, limiting the 
membership in the House of Representatives would save the 
people approximately $450,000, by Ames's estimation, 
resulting from an increase of the size the committee had 
proposed. Second, Ames contented "that, in proportion as
20ibid., 1: 719-20.
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you increase the number of Representatives, the body 
degenerates; you diminish the individual usefulness."21 And 
third, an increase in the number of representatives would 
lead to "an excitement of or fermentation in the 
representative body. Numerous assemblies are supposed to be 
less under the guidance of reason than smaller ones."22
Ames’s arguments failed to convince either Michael 
Stone of Maryland or the Committee of the Whole. Stone 
contended that a ratio of one representatives for every 
thirty thousand persons was needed to guarantee the people's 
liberties; the more representatives, the better. He noted 
that in a population of three million persons, a ratio of 
one to thirty thousand would permit only one hundred 
representatives--a dangerously small number. Of that one 
hundred, fifty-one members formed a quorum and twenty-six 
comprised a majority of that quorum. Combined with the 
seven Senators needed for a majority in that body, Stone 
contended that a mere thirty-three individuals could decide 
the United States' future. The Committee of the Whole 
agreed with Stone that the American republic could not 
afford to reduce its future number of representatives by 
one-forth and hope to remain free. It therefore 
overwhelmingly rejected Ames's proposal.23
21lbid., 1: 720.
22ibid.
23ibid., 1: 725.
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Following Stone's comments, Theodore Sedgwick of 
Massachusetts successfully moved to substitute two hundred 
for one hundred seventy-five in the amendment as the maximum 
number of representatives allowed in the House. He believed 
that a House of Representatives of only one hundred seventy- 
five members would be a body too small to represent properly 
the divergent interests throughout the United States. It is 
no surprise that Sedgwick submitted his proposal. The 
apportionment amendment proposed by the Massachusetts 
ratifying convention called for two hundred representatives 
in the House. Sedgwick, who served as a delegate from 
Berkshire County to his state's ratifying convention, surely 
found his inspiration for his proposal in that convention's 
proposed constitutional amendments.24
Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire stated that he was 
not satisfied with the apportionment amendment. As the 
amendment was written, it contained no provisions for the 
periodic increase of representatives in the House. Taking 
the Virginia, New York, and Madison amendments as his model, 
Livermore proposed to add a clause to Congress's amendment 
stating that as the United States' population increased, so 
would representation in the House. As the last order of 
business for the day, Livermore's proposal was incorporated 
into the House version of the apportionment amendment.25
24ibid.; Bill of Rights. 2: 721. 
25Annals of Congress, 1: 726.
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Before the House could take its vote on the Committee 
of Eleven's other amendments, Roger Sherman, on 19 August, 
successfully moved that the amendments be added to the 
Constitution as separate articles, not as changes to the 
Constitution's existing text.26 Five days later the House 
sent its finalized list of seventeen amendments to the 
Senate for its concurrence. The first of those amendments 
was the apportionment amendment. It read:
After the first enumeration required by the first Article of the Constitution, there shall be one 
Representative for every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there 
shall be not less than one hundred Representatives, nor 
less than one Representatives for every forty thousand persons, until the number of Representatives shall 
amount to two hundred, after which there shall not be 
less than two hundred Representatives, nor less than one Representatives for every fifty thousand persons.27
One will note that the House version of the 
apportionment amendment sent to the Senate on 24 August is 
significantly different from the amendment discussed and 
passed by the Committee of the Whole on 14 August. But the 
records of the discussion of amendments in the Committee of 
the Whole made no mention of a ratio of one representative 
to forty thousand inhabitants until the number of 
representatives in the Congress reached two hundred, or a
26ibid., 1: 766.
27The Journal of the Senate Including the Journal of 
the Executive Proceedings of the Senate (New York: Thomas 
Greenleaf, 1789; reprint, 9 vols., Martin P. Claussen, ed., 
Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1977), 1: 104 (page 
references are to reprint edition; hereinafter cited as Senate Journal).
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ratio of not less than one to fifty thousand after the 
number. Unfortunately, neither the House Journal nor the 
Annals of Congress mention the proceedings in which the 
amendment was altered. Additionally, no contemporary 
newspapers reported the proceedings that changed the 
amendment. Therefore, there is a ten day period, from 14 
August to 24 August 1789, during which significant changes 
were made to the apportionment amendment. However, the 
details of the debate surrounding those changes were not 
recorded in any available contemporary source.
On 2 September the Senate considered the House 
apportionment amendment. A motion to increase the minimum 
number of representatives from one hundred to two hundred 
failed. The Senate then changed the House amendment to read 
that after the first one hundred representatives were 
apportioned in the House, one additional representative 
would be added for each increase of forty thousand in the 
nation's population. Once the membership in the House 
reached two hundred, the ratio would be reduced to one 
additional representative for each increase in population of 
sixty thousand.28
One week later the Senate passed its final list of 
amendments. The next day the House of Representatives 
received the Senate list. Madison noted the list and wrote 
to Edmund Pendleton that "the Senate have sent back the plan
28ibid 1: 117.
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of amendments with some alterations which strike in my 
opinion at the most salutary articles."29 On 21 September 
the House voted to disagree with several of the Senate’s 
amendments, including the apportionment amendment. However, 
the House also agreed that a conference committee be 
established between the two houses to discuss the 
amendments. Madison, Sherman, and Vining were selected to 
serve as the House managers of the committee. That same 
day, after notification of the House decision, the Senate 
chose Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, Charles Carroll of 
Maryland, and William Patterson of New Jersey to meet the 
House committee representatives in hope of reaching an 
agreement on the amendments to the Constitution.30
On 23 September Madison again wrote to Pendleton. In 
his letter he noted that the Congress would soon adjourn, 
and rather than risk forfeiture of all the amendments, he 
was willing to accept the Senate list with minor changes.
The same day, both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate heard the Conference Report. The report suggested 
that the Senate accept the House version of the 
apportionment amendment if the last line of the amendment 
were changed to read, "that there shall be not less than two
29james Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 14 September 1789, Madison, 12: 402.
30jpurnal of the House of Representatives (New York: 
Francis Childs and John Swaine, 1789; reprint, 9 vols., 
Martin P. Claussen, ed., Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1977), 1: 151 (page references are to reprint edition; 
hereinafter cited as House Journal).
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hundred Representatives, nor more than one Representative
for every fifty thousand persons."31 The final
apportionment amendment would therefore read:
After the first enumeration required by the first 
Article of the Constitution, there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one hundred, after which the 
proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall be not less than one hundred Representatives, nor less than one Representative for every forty thousand 
persons, until the number of Representatives shall amount to two hundred, after which time the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall not 
be less than two hundred Representatives, nor less than one Representatives for every fifty thousand persons.32
On 24 September the House agreed to the Conference 
report by a vote of thirty-seven in favor and fourteen 
opposed. The next day the Senate concurred in the 
amendments as approved by the House. A total of twelve 
amendments were submitted to President Washington who 
forwarded them to the states one week later. The first of 
those amendments was the apportionment amendment and the 
second prohibited the Congress from granting itself a mid­
term pay raise. The remaining ten amendments were the 
guarantees of liberties that eventually became the Bill of
31james Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 23 September 1789, 
Madison, 12: 418; Senate Journal, 1: 145.
32u.s. Congress. House. The Constitution of the United 
States of America as amended through July 1971, Analytical 
Index. Unratified Amendments. 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972. 
House Doc. 92-157. (Washington: GPO, 1972), 25 (hereinfater 
cited as Analytical Index).
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Rights. Washington forwarded them to the states one week 
later.33
Once in the states, the supporters of the amendments
hoped for a guick ratification by ten of the states. But
Edward Carrington, in a letter to Madison, noted that the
ratification of the apportionment amendment would be
difficult. In considering the amendments, he noted,
One of them which seems at present to be much approved 
of & was indeed made a considerable object of by all the 
States, will not, I apprehend, be found good in 
practice--I mean the excessive enlargement of the 
representation. . . .34
Unfortunately we know little of what transpired in the 
ratification conventions in the states. There are no 
journals for the state conventions comparable to the House 
Journal or the Annals of Congress. Yet, there must have 
been some divisions within those conventions. Final 
ratification of the Bill of Rights by the reguired three- 
fourths of the states was not completed until 1792. 
Additionally, three of the original thirteen states, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Georgia, did not ratify the 
Bill of Rights until 1939.35
The apportionment amendment addressed the Anti- 
Federalists ' demand that the House be increased in size and
33House Journal. 1: 152; Senate Journal. 1: 150-51; The 
Massachusetts Spy. 15 October 1791.
34Edward Carrington to James Madison, 9 September 1789, 
Madison, 12: 393.
35Analvtical Index. 12.
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yet met the Federalists' insistence that the House of 
Representatives remain limited in membership. Therefore it 
faced little opposition in the early stages of the 
ratification debates in the states. On 25 January 1790, 
President Washington transmitted Maryland's message of 
ratification to the Congress. On 19 December, Maryland's 
Senate had agreed with its House of Delegates to ratify all 
twelve of the proposed amendments. Twenty days later 
Washington presented the Congress with another ratification 
message. On 29 January the New Hampshire legislature had 
ratified all the amendments except the second--the amendment 
prohibiting the Congress from granting itself a mid-term pay 
raise.36 it appeared as if Carrington had perhaps 
underestimated the support for the apportionment amendment.
But the supporters of the apportionment amendment 
suffered a defeat on 8 March. Washington submitted to the 
Congress Delaware's ratification message. In it, the 
Governor of Delaware notified Washington that his state 
legislature had ratified all the proposed constitutional 
amendments except the first. Eight days later, the 
apportionment amendment was rejected by another state. The
36House Journal, 2: 18-19; New York Journal and Weekly 
Register. 10 December 1789; House Journal, 2: 35-36; New 
York Journal and Weekly Register, 11 February 1790; United 
States Chronicle, 21 February 1790.
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Pennsylvania legislature had voted, like Delaware's, to 
accept all the proposed amendments except the first.37
Pennsylvania's refusal to ratify the apportionment 
amendment virtually assured that it would not become part of 
the Bill of Rights. Although Washington submitted 
ratification notices for South Carolina on 1 April, New York 
on 5 April, North Carolina on 25 May, Rhode Island on 30 
June, and New Jersey on 4 August, it was clear that the 
apportionment amendment would not have the support of the 
required ten states for incorporation into the Bill of
Rights.38
It made little difference that Vermont, after being 
admitted to the Union on 4 March 1791, ratified the proposed 
first amendment. The apportionment amendment then had the 
support of eight states, but it remained three short of the 
ratification of the required three-fourths of the states. 
Although Virginia finally ratified all twelve proposed 
amendments to the Constitution on 15 December 1791, the 
apportionment amendment died.39
Eleven of the fourteen states ratified amendments III 
though XII of the Congress's proposed list. Those ten
37House Journal, 2: 49-50; New York Journal and Weekly 
Register, 18 February 1790; House Journal, 2: 56; New York 
Journal and Weekly Register, 25 March 1790.
38House Journal. 2: 71, 73, 137-38, 154, 202-03; New York Journal and Weekly Register, 19 November 1789; The 
Massachusetts Spy, 3 December 1789.
39Analvtical Index, 12.
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amendments were added to the Constitution as the Bill of 
Rights. Only six states ratified the proposed second 
amendment. The apportionment amendment was ratified by nine 
of the required eleven states. The attempt to pass a 
constitutional amendment guaranteeing a periodic increase in 
the size of the House of Representatives had failed. The 
debate over the size of the House would therefore shift to 
the Second Congress as the supporters of an increase in the 
size of the House would attempt to pass apportionment 
legislation guaranteeing that increase by statute law.
CHAPTER 5
THE REPRESENTATION DEBATE IN THE SECOND CONGRESS
By October 1791 the apportionment debate was again 
before the Congress. The proposed first amendment to the 
Constitution had passed only six of the eleven states 
required for ratification. The debate over the 
apportionment of representatives in the House remained 
unsettled. Proponents of a larger House of Representatives 
therefore set out to pass regular statute law to increase 
the number of representatives in the House.
The Second Congress convened on 24 October 1791. The 
apportionment issued surfaced one week later. John 
Laurance, a representative from New York, started the debate 
when he submitted an apportionment resolution in the House 
of Representatives. House Resolution 147 read: "That till 
the time of the next enumeration, the number of 
Representatives shall be one to every thirty thousand 
inhabitants."1
Laurance's resolution had significant implications for 
the make-up of the House of Representatives. Laurance 
proposed increasing the number of representatives in the
^Debates and Proceedings of the Congress of the United 
States, 1789-1834 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834-56),42 vols. 3: 148 (hereinafter cited as Annals of Congress).
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House from the constitutionally mandated sixty-five to one 
hundred and twelve. Based on the Census of 1790, Laurance's 
resolution would have been a political windfall for the 
South and the larger Mid-Atlantic States. The South would 
garner twenty-two additional representatives in the 
reapportionment. New York and Pennsylvania could expect to 
gain eleven representatives between them. But the New 
England states would gain a total of only thirteen 
additional members in the House of Representatives (see 
table 1).
New Englanders realized the political threat posed by 
Laurance's resolution. Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts 
argued that although the Constitution provided for a 
representation ratio no greater than one representative for 
each thirty thousand persons, he preferred to see the number 
of representatives in the House limited to one hundred. 
Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire seconded Sedgwick's 
sentiments. He was in favor of any ratio that would lead to 
the smallest number of representatives possible. Another 
Northerner, Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey, noted that his 
constituents were opposed to any significant increase in the 
number of representatives in the House.2
On 3 November the Committee of the Whole considered 
Laurance's resolution. Sedgwick contended that the 
representation ratio in Laurance's resolution was too small.
2Ibid., 3: 149.
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Table 1
Representatives Apportioned under the Constitution and Proposed H.R. 1473
New Enaland States Constitution H.R. 147 GainVermont 0 2 2New Hampshire 3 4 1Massachusetts 8 15 7Rhode Island 1 2 1Connecticut 5 7 2
Middle States 17 30 13
New York 6 11 5New Jersey 4 5 1Pennsylvania 8 14 6Delaware 1 1 0
19 31 12
Southern States
Maryland 6 9 3Virginia 10 21 11Kentucky 0 2 2North Carolina 5 11 6South Carolina 5 6 1Georgia 3 2 -1
29 51 22
Total 65 112 47
—
Note: Vermont was admitted to the Union 
Kentucky was admitted 1 June 1792.
on 4 March 1791
3President Washington transmitted a summary of the 
results of the Census of 1790 to the Congress on 27 October 
1791. Heads of Families at the First Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1790: Vermont (Baltimore: 
Genealogical Publishing Company, 1966), 4 (hereinafter cited 
as Census 1790). Constitution, art. I, sec. 2. Author's own 
calculations for the number of representatives apportioned 
to each state. It is significant to note that the number of 
representatives apportioned in Laurance's resolution was 
identical to the number that would have been apportioned 
under the apportionment amendment in the First Congress.See Appendix 6 for the population figures found in the 
Census of 1790. All population figures used for apportionment are based on each state's free population and three-fifths of its slave population.
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He proposed limiting the size of the House to one hundred 
members by increasing the ratio to one representative for 
each thirty-four thousand inhabitants. Livermore went even 
further and argued for a ratio of one to forty thousand. 
Abraham Clark of New Jersey stated that since the people of 
the United States were concerned over the expenses of 
maintaining the government, any increase in the number of 
representatives in the House should be considered with 
caution--a reapportionment of representatives would surely 
unnecessarily increase the government's expenses. He 
seconded Livermore's proposal in hope of limiting the House 
to eighty-one members.4
Laurance objected to Livermore's proposal. He 
contended that when the Constitution was ratified in 1788, 
the majority of Americans had agreed to the ratio of one 
representative for each thirty thousand persons. Clark's 
objections that an increase in the number of representatives 
in the House would raise the costs of government were 
unreasonable. Laurance claimed that since the difference 
between his proposal of one representative for every thirty 
thousand inhabitants and Sedgwick's proposed ratio of one 
Congressman for each thirty-four thousand individuals was 
only twelve representatives, the resulting increase in the 
costs to the government was minimal. Additionally, any 
attempt at limiting the number of representatives in the
4 Ibid., 3: 154.
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House was detrimental to the people's trust in the Congress: 
"The Government is a Government by representation, and it is 
of the last importance that the confidence of the people 
should be inspired by the feeling that their interests are 
fully represented"5 (see table 2).
Table 2
Representatives.Apportioned under Each 
Proposed Representation Ratio6
State 1:30 1:33 1:34 1:35 1:40
Vermont 2 2 2 2 2New Hampshire 4 4 4 4 3
Massachusetts 15 14 13 13 11
Rhode Island 2 2 2 1 1Connecticut 7 7 6 6 5
30 29 27 26 22
New York 11 10 9 9 8New Jersey 5 5 5 5 4
Pennsylvania 14 13 12 12 10Delaware 1 1 1 1 1
31 29 27 27 23
Maryland 9 8 8 7 6
Virginia 21 19 18 18 15
Kentucky 2 2 2 1 1
North Carolina 11 10 10 10 8
South Carolina 6 6 6 5 5
Georgia 2 2 2 2 1
51 47 46 43 36
Total 112 105 100 96 81
■* -----------
Note: Ratios are one 
thousands.
representative for each tens of
5Annals of Congress, 3: 154-55
6Author's own calculations based on the population 
figures in the Census of 1790.
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After a one week reprieve from debate, the House, on 10 
November, again considered the representation ratio.
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts spoke in favor of one 
representative for each thirty-thousand persons. Although 
he failed to sign the Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787, 
he argued that the people's wishes as expressed in the 
Constitution must be observed.
Gerry reminded the Committee of the Whole that the 
government was a government of representation. Since the 
people had a direct say in the selection of neither the 
President nor the Senate, the House was their sole voice in 
the national government. He feared that if the number of 
representatives were to remain small, the common man would 
want for advocates in the federal government. The American 
people, with the ratification of the Constitution, expected 
a representation ratio of one to thirty thousand. He asked 
the members of the House if it would not therefore be 
perceived as an abuse of their position to increase the 
representation ratio and thereby limit the size of future 
Congresses.
Gerry contended that the cost of additional 
representatives was negligible. In his estimation, adding 
forty-seven members to the House would have increased its 
expenditures by only one-eighteenth. But, he also noted 
that he preferred to leave the issue unsettled. Since by 
October 1791 only seven states had ratified the 
apportionment amendment, the Congress should let the issue
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stand. He suggested waiting until the number of 
representatives reached one hundred under the Constitution's 
provisions. The Congress at that time could then alter the 
ratio better to match the political opinion of the day.7
Elias Boudinot of New Jersey took issue with Gerry's 
arguments for a ratio of one representatives for every 
thirty thousand persons. He argued that even if the House's 
operating costs would only increase by one-eighteenth as 
Gerry suggested, that one-eighteenth rise was too much. He 
noted that although he was willing to tax the American 
people, he was unwilling to burden them with unnecessary 
expenses. Coupled with the fact that only seven states had 
adopted the proposed first amendment and two different 
representation ratios had been proposed to the Congress, the 
House should consider a compromise ratio of one 
representative for every thirty-five thousand persons.8
John Steele of North Carolina, speaking against his 
fellow Southerners, and Abraham Clark of New Jersey 
presented similar arguments against Laurance's resolution. 
Clark noted that his opposition was not based solely on
7Ibid., 3: 168-69. By 10 November only New Jersey, 
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, New Hampshire, and 
Rhode Island had ratified the apportionment amendment. The 
next day, Virginia became the eight state to ratify. Ibid., 
1: 1983-90.
8Ibid., 169-170. Boudinot presented apportionment 
figures based on his own calculations. By those 
calculations, a ratio of one to thirty-three thousand would 
lead to 113 representatives. A ratio of one to forty thousand would lead to 81 representatives.
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finances; he feared that as the number of representatives 
increased, so would nepotism within the government. Steele 
argued that a representation ratio of one to thirty thousand 
would almost double the number of Congressmen in the House, 
thus dividing and diminishing the effectiveness of the 
House. He stated: "Too numerous an Assembly is perpetually 
liable to disorder; and when that is the case Government 
becomes contemptible."9
Laurance countered that any increase in expenditures 
resulting from an increase in the number of representatives 
was insignificant. Since "the existence of the Union may 
depend on the fulness of representation," the additional 
expenses would be negated by the positive gains of a larger 
representation.10
Abraham Baldwin of Georgia defended Laurance's 
resolution. He argued that representation in the national 
legislature should be based on the size of the United 
States. He contended that while a representation ratio of 
one representative for every thirty-four thousand or thirty- 
five thousand persons could work in England or France, a 
similar ratio was impractical in the United States. The 
size of the United States dictated that more representatives 
were needed than in either England or France. If 
republicanism were to succeed in an area as large as the
9 Ibid., 3: 170-71.
10Ibid., 3: 172.
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United States, the representation ratio needed to guarantee 
as many representatives in the House as possible.11
On 14 November the House again debated the 
apportionment issue. The guestion of the people's stake in 
government remained the central issue. William Findley of 
Pennsylvania noted that
a large representation embraces these interests more 
fully, and is more competent to giving and receiving information. The objects of legislation are such as 
come home to the doors, to the feeling of very man; the Government ought therefore to secure the confidence of 
the people by a large representation.12
William Giles of Virginia supported Findley's statements and
argued that since the American people were familiar with the
ratio of one representative for each thirty thousand
persons, any change in that ratio would be perceived as
corruption on the part of the Congress.12
The next day the representation question was again the 
central topic of debate in the Committee of the Whole. John 
Page of Virginia noted, like Gerry, that it would be best if 
the representation issue were settled by a later Congress 
where the implications of the debate would be more 
significantly felt. But he also stated, "it is not and 
cannot be the interest or the wish of the people at large to
1:LIbid., 3: 173-75. 
12 Ibid., 3: 177.
12Ibid., 3: 178-79.
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have a small representation in the Congress under the 
present Government.
Abraham Clark felt differently. He was convinced that 
a larger representative body would lead to corruption. In 
response to one of Findley's earlier statements that more 
wisdom would be brought into the House by increasing the 
ratio, Clark asked whether that increase would not instead 
bring folly. Lacking confidence in the polity to make the 
"virtuous" decisions in the election of their leaders, Clark 
argued,
If ever the liberties of the People are endangered, it 
will not be by the smallness of the representation, but by the corruption of electors and elections. This is 
the door which Congress should guard in the strictest 
manner, and that will secure the people against corruption in the House.14 5 *
With Clark's objections aside, Laurance's resolution 
was put to a vote of the Committee of the Whole. It passed 
by a margin of thirty-five in favor and twenty-three 
opposed. The chairman then ordered that John Page, William 
Vans Murray of Maryland, and Nathaniel Macon of North 
Carolina prepare an apportionment bill based on Laurance's 
resolution for submittal to the House.15 On 21 November,
14Ibid., 3: 181-82.
15Ibid., 3: 185.
15The Journal of the House of Representatives 
(Philadelphia: Francis Childs and John Swaine, 1792; 
reprint, 9 vols., Martin P. Claussen, ed.,Wilmington Del.: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1977), 4: 30-31 (page reference are 
to reprint; hereinafter cited as House Journal). For a 
complete description of the measure and vote, see Appendix 
1, roll call 1.
69
Page's committee reported its bill to the Committee of the 
Whole. As instructed, it stated that after 3 March 1793, 
therefore in the Third Congress, representation would be 
apportioned among the states at a ratio of one 
representative for each thirty thousand persons.I7
After a failed attempt on 23 November to change the 
bill to reflect a representation ratio of one to thirty-four 
thousand, the House, on 24 November, took its roll call on 
the apportionment committee's bill. By a vote of forty- 
three in favor and twelve opposed, the House passed its 
first apportionment bill.1** Unfortunately for the 
supporters of that bill, the Senate, on 8 December, returned 
it to the House. But before doing so, the Senate voted on 
the same day to amend the House bill to include a 
representation ratio of one to thirty-three thousand. ^
Findley, on 12 December, dubiously contended that the 
apportionment provisions in the Senate bill were 
unconstitutional. He stated: "The Constitution of the 
United States is express in the subject, and now is the time 17*9
17Ibid., 4: 35.
■'■®Ibid., 4: 37. See Appendix 1, roll call 2.
19Ibid., 40-41. See Appendix 1, roll call 3; The 
Journal of the Senate Including the Journal of the Executive 
Proceedings of the Senate (Philadelphia: John Fenno, 1792; 
reprint, 9 vols., Martin P. Claussen, ed., Wilmington, Del.: 
Michael Glazier, Inc., 1977), 4: 55-56 (page references are 
to reprint; hereinafter cited as Senate Journal).
70
when the people ought to enjoy the advantages of the 
representation of one to each thirty thousand."20
Two days later the House considered whether to agree to 
the Senate's amendments to the apportionment bill. But 
before that vote could be taken, John Vining of Delaware 
submitted an amendment to the bill dictating each state's 
number of representatives in the House. Almost identical to 
a later bill proposed by the Senate on 12 March 1792, it 
mentioned neither a representation ratio nor a later 
apportionment. After Vining's amendment failed, a roll call 
was taken on whether to incorporate the Senate's 
apportionment ratio of one to thirty-three thousand. By a 
narrow margin of only two votes, the House voted not to 
agree to the Senate's amended apportionment bill.21
The next day the Senate debated the apportionment 
issue. By a vote of thirteen to twelve, with the Vice- 
President casting the deciding vote, the Senate voted not to 
recede from its amendment calling for an apportionment ratio 
of one to thirty-three thousand. Additionally, the Senate 
failed to agree that a compromise committee comprised of 
members from both houses was needed to discuss the issue.22
2°Annals of Congress, 3: 243-45. The Constitution's 
apportionment provisions stated not more than one representative for every thirty thousand, not one 
representative for every thirty thousand, a significant 
difference.
2lHouse Journal, 4: 54-55; See Appendix 1, roll calls
4-5.
22senate Journal. 4: 60-61.
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Four days later the apportionment bill was back in the 
House of Representatives. Two roll calls were taken on 
whether to agree to the Senate's apportionment ratio of one 
representatives for each thirty-three thousand persons.
Both votes failed. The next day, 20 December 1791, the 
first apportionment bill died when the Senate again voted 
not to recede from its insistence on its ratio of one 
representatives for each thirty-three thousand persons.2^
Through the first three weeks of January 1972 the House 
considered business other than the apportionment issue.
Then on 24 January it resumed its debate on the 
representation ratio. On the same day, the Committee of the 
Whole was presented with a new apportionment resolution.
The wording in the resolution, with two very significant 
exceptions, was similar to the bill rejected by the Senate 
on 20 December 1791. The first exception stated that a 
reapportionment would take place after 3 March 1797 and the 
convening of the Fifth Congress instead of 3 March 1793 and 
the Third Congress. Additionally, it read, "and no greater 
ratio be reported, than thirty thousand inhabitants for 
every representative."* 24
Northerners immediately attacked the apportionment 
resolution. Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey unsuccessfully 
moved to strike out the section of the resolution calling
^House Journal, 4: 58-60. See Appendix 1, roll calls 
6-7; Senate Journal, 4: 64.
24House Journal, 4: 83.
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for a second enumeration. Dayton hoped to keep the 
population figures used in the apportionment of 
representatives static and to deny the South the increase in 
representatives as its population expanded into its western 
frontier.25 26
Livermore, on the heels of Dayton's motion, offered 
another amendment to the resolution. He argued that since 
the Senate had previously rejected the ratio of one 
representative for each thirty thousand persons, the House, 
in the interests of compromise, should prevent it from being 
reported by striking out the section of the resolution 
prohibiting a ratio greater than one representative for 
thirty thousand persons from being reported. 25
Livermore contended that a representation ratio of one 
representative for every thirty thousand persons would cause 
too many Americans to be unrepresented.27 For example, if 
one were to take New Hampshire's population of 141,822 and 
apply a representation ratio of one representative for every 
thirty thousand inhabitants, New Hampshire would be allotted 
four representatives. But, those four representatives 
actually would represent only 120,000 of New Hampshire's 
inhabitants. Therefore, New Hampshire would have nearly 
twenty-two thousand persons, the difference between 141,888
2^Ibid., 4: 83-84. See Appendix 1, roll call 8.
26Ibid., 4: 84.
27Annals of Congress, 3: 332.
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and 120,000, without representation. But at a ratio of one 
representative for every thirty-three thousand inhabitants, 
the number of New Hampshire's inhabitants without 
representation declined to less than ten thousand. Under a 
ratio of one to thirty thousand, Virginia would have a mere 
559 inhabitants without representation, while Maryland would 
have less than nine thousand persons without representation. 
In fact, the most advantageous representation ratio for 
Maryland and Virginia was one to thirty thousand. However, 
at the same ratio, all the New England states, with the 
exception of Rhode Island, had at least six thousand, and up 
to twenty-one thousand, individuals without representation 
as compared to a ratio of one to thirty-three thousand (see 
table 3).
Although Livermore's argument disregarded the non­
representation of the remaining two-fifths of the nation's 
slave population, it was convincing enough to the members of 
the Committee of the Whole to accept the amendment.28
Egbert Benson of New York, James Madison of Virginia, 
and Gerry were then instructed to prepare an apportionment 
bill based on the House's amended resolution. On 13 
February the committee presented its resolution to the 
Committee of the Whole. Numbered H.R. 163, it contained no 
mention of a representation ratio. It did, however, contain 
provisions for a second enumeration and a subsequent 28
28House Journal, 4: 84-85. See Appendix 1, roll call 
9 .
reapportionment of representatives after 3 March 1797— the 
beginning of the Fifth Congress.29
Table 3
Number of Persons Unrepresented under Each 
Proposed Representation Ratio30 31
State 1: 30 1: 33 1: 34 1: 35 1:40Vermont 25,533 19,533 7,533 15,533 5,533New Hampshire 21,822 9,822 5,822 1,822 21,822Massachusetts 25,327 13,327 33,327 20,327 35,327Rhode Island 8,446 2,446 446 33,446 28,446Connecticut 26,840 5,840 32,840 26,840 36,840
New York 1,590 1,590 25,590 16,590 11,590
New Jersey 29,570 14,570 9,570 4,570 19,570
Pennsylvania 12,878 3,878 24,878 12,878 32,878Delaware 25,541 22,541 21,541 20,541 15,541
Maryland 8,514 14,514 6,514 33,514 38,514Virginia 559 3,559 18,559 559 30,559Kentucky 8,705 2,705 705 33,705 28,705North Carolina 28,522 23,522 13,522 3,522 33,522South Carolina 26,235 8,235 2,235 31,235 6,235Georgia 10,842 4,842 2,842 842 30,842
Joshua Seney of Maryland argued that a representation 
ratio of one to thirty thousand should be added to H.R. 163. 
His fellow representative from Maryland, John Mercer, called 
for as small a ratio as possible. Mercer contended that a 
small number of representatives could not rule properly and 
the eventual result of a limited membership in the House 
would be despotism.33
29Ibid., 4: 97.
30Author's own calculations. Ratios are in tens of thousands.
31Annals of Congress. 3: 403-05.
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On 20 February Seney's proposal was incorporated into 
H.R. 163. But before that, two roll calls were taken on the 
provisions in H.R. 163 calling for a second enumeration.
The implications of those roll calls were significant. If 
the amendments had passed, reapportionment would be based 
solely on population figures in the Census of 1790. While 
that census favored the Southern states in 1790, New 
Englanders could be sure that a later census would favor the 
same states even more. Certainly the South, with larger 
back-countries open to settlement vis-a-vis New England, 
would experience a significant population increase. Among 
the Southern states, only Maryland, with a fixed western 
boundary, could not expect a massive population growth on 
the western frontier. Therefore, if a reapportionment were 
to be made following a second census, New England could 
expect to lose even more representative strength in the 
House. But since those amendments failed, the apportionment 
of representatives would reflect future changes in the 
distribution of population throughout the country.32
The next day, 21 February, the House took its vote on 
H.R. 163. By a margin of eighteen votes, the Committee of 
the Whole found all the provisions of H.R. 163 acceptable. 
The House apportionment bill thereafter incorporated all the 
points of the earlier debate. It included provisions for 
making a apportionment based on the Census of 1790 at a
32House Journal, 4: 104-07. See Appendix 1, roll calls 
1 0 - 1 2 .
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representation ratio of one representative for every thirty 
thousand persons. It additionally directed a second 
enumeration on which to base the apportionment of 
representatives to compose the House after the Fifth 
Congress.33
On 6 March, H.R. 163 was read for a second time in the 
Senate. As the first order of business the Senate 
considered an amendment delaying the reapportionment date 
until 3 March 1803— the Eight House. Although that 
amendment failed, the Senate, through another amendment, 
succeeded in establishing 3 March 1793, the start of the 
Third House, as the apportionment date.34
But even more drastic changes were made to H.R. 163 on 
12 March. The Senate amended the bill to read that after 3 
March 1793 the House of Representatives would be comprised 
of one hundred and twenty members. New Hampshire would 
receive five representatives, Massachusetts sixteen, Vermont 
three, Rhode Island two, Connecticut eight, New York eleven, 
New Jersey six, Pennsylvania fourteen, Delaware two,
Maryland nine, Virginia twenty-one, Kentucky two, North 
Carolina twelve, South Carolina seven, and Georgia two. 
Although a representation ratio of one to thirty thousand 
was proposed for the bill, it failed to garner enough 
support to pass. As a result, the Senate version of the
33ibid., 4: 108-09. See Appendix 1, roll call 13.
34senate Journal. 4: 145-47.
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apportionment bill contained no mention of any 
representation ratio on which to base future 
reapportionments.33
The Senate bill offered little to the Southern states 
(see table 4). Only North and South Carolina could
Table 4
Representatives Apportioned under the Constitution, H.R. 147, and the Senate Bill36
State Constitution H.R. 147 Senate Bill
Vermont 0 2 3New Hampshire 3 4 5Massachusetts 8 15 16Rhode Island 1 2 2Connecticut 5 7 8
17 30 34
New York 6 11 11New Jersey 4 5 6Pennsylvania 8 14 14Delaware 1 1 2
19 31 33
Maryland 6 9 9Virginia 10 21 21Kentucky 0 2 2
North Carolina 5 11 12
South Carolina 5 6 7Georgia 3 2 2
29 51 53
Total 65 112 120
expect to gain additional representatives under the Senate 
bill as compared to their apportionment at a ratio of one to 35*
35Ibid., 152-54.
36Author's own calculations.
78
thirty thousand. New York's and Pennsylvania's 
apportionments remained the same. But the New England 
states would receive an additional four representatives. 
Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Massachusetts would 
each earn an additional representative when compared to 
their apportionment at a ratio of one to thirty thousand.
The House considered the Senate's finalized bill under 
the name H.R. 179. The Committee of the Whole, on 17 March, 
failed to agree to the Senate bill dictating the number of 
representatives at one hundred-twenty. But realizing the 
implications of its vote, it agreed to establish a 
conference committee comprised of members from each house to 
confer on the apportionment issue. Two days later the 
Senate concurred that a conference committee was in order.37
The House's committee representatives, Madison,
Findley, James Hillhouse of Connecticut, William C. Smith of 
South Carolina, and Baldwin met with Oliver Ellsworth, Aaron 
Burr, and Pierce Butler through 22 March. On that day, 
Ellsworth reported to the Senate that the committee had been 
unable to reach an agreement on the apportionment issue.
The Senate then voted in favor of insisting on all its 
amendments to H.R. 179.37 8
37House Journal, 4: 137-38. See Appendix 1, roll call14 .
38Annals of Congress, 3: 474, 109; Senate Journal, 4: 
162-63. Madison had remained silent on the representation 
debate in the Second Congress until his selection to the 
committee.
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On 23 March a breakthrough was made in the 
apportionment debate. By a margin of only two votes, the 
House of Representatives agreed to recede from all its 
disagreements to H.R. 179. With that vote, the Congress had 
finally reached a consensus on the apportionment issue. All 
that was required to make the bill law was President George 
Washington's signature.39 *
However, Washington refused to sign the Congress's 
apportionment bill. After conferring with his cabinet, on 5 
April he returned the bill to the House of Representatives 
with its first veto message. In that message he stated two 
objections to the bill. First, there was "no one proportion 
or divisor, which, applied to the respective numbers of the 
states, will yield the number and allotment of 
representatives proposed by the bill."40
Six different representation ratios were used in the 
bill. Delaware's ratio was one to twenty-seven thousand 
thus assuring it of at least two members in the House. New 
Hampshire's and Vermont's representatives were apportioned 
at a ratio of one to twenty-eight thousand. The 
representatives of three Northern states, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, and New Jersey, and two Southern states, North 
Carolina and South Carolina, were apportioned at the ratio
39House Journal, 4: 146-47, See Appendix 1, roll call
15.
4^Harold C. Syrett, ed., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton. 27 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1961-87), 11: 226-30; House Journal, 4: 168.
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of one representative for each twenty-nine thousand persons. 
The largest remaining states, whose populations assured them 
of a significant number of representatives in the House, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, had their 
representatives apportioned at a ratio of one to thirty 
thousand. Rhode Island and Kentucky, two states with 
virtually the same population, had ratios of one to thirty- 
four thousand. Georgia's representatives were figured at a 
ratio of one to thirty-five thousand.41
Washington's second objection was that the Constitution 
provided for a representation ratio no greater than one 
representative for each thirty thousand persons.42 As noted 
above, the Congress's apportionment figures were in direct 
violation of the Constitution's restrictions on 
apportionment ratios. He wrote that as the bill stood, 
eight states were allotted representatives at a ratio of 
more than one representative for every thirty thousand 
inhabitants.
Eight states were indeed apportioned representatives at 
a ratio of greater than one to each thirty thousand. 
Therefore, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, and South
41Each state's representation ratio was determined by 
dividing the state’s population by the number of representatives apportioned to it. Author's own 
calculations.
42House Journal, 4: 168.
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Carolina were all 
prohibited by the
allotted representation at a 
Constitution (see table 5).
ratio
Table 5
Representation Ratios in H.R. 17943
Representatives RepresentationState under H.R. 179 Population RatioVermont 3 85,533 1:28,000New Hampshire 5 141,822 1:28,000Massachusetts 16 475,327 1:29,000Rhode Island 2 68,446 1: 34,000Connecticut 8 236,840 1:29,000
New York 11 331,590 1:30,000New Jersey 6 179,570 1:29,000
Pennsylvania 14 432,878 1:30,000Delaware 2 55,541 1:27,000
Maryland 9 278,514 1:30,000Virginia 21 630,559 1:30,000Kentucky 2 68,705 1:34,000
North Carolina 12 353,522 1:29,000
South Carolina 7 206,235 1:29,000Georgia 2 70,842 1:35,000
On 6 April the House attempted to override the 
President's veto of H.R. 179. By a vote of twenty-eight in 
favor and thirty-three opposed the House failed to muster 
the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution to pass 
H.R. 179 over Washington's veto. The next day, a committee 
comprised of Laurance, the individual who started the 
apportionment debate with his resolution calling for a 
representation ratio of one to thirty thousand, Seney, and
43Author's own calculations.
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Jeremiah Smith of New Hampshire was formed to devise a new 
apportionment bill.44 45
Laurance's committee reported its revised version of 
H.R. 179 to the House on 9 April. Instead of dictating the 
representation ratio to the House, the committee left that 
portion of the bill blank. With virtually no debate, a roll 
call was taken of the House to insert in the blank the ratio 
of one representative for each thirty-three thousand 
persons. By a vote of thirty-four in favor, thirty opposed, 
that ratio was engrossed into H.R. 179. With no more 
objection to the apportionment bill in the House, it was 
sent to the Senate for its concurrence.4^
The next day, 10 April, H.R. 179 passed the Senate 
without any amendments. When President Washington signed it 
into law on 14 April as "An Act for apportioning 
Representatives among the several states according to the 
First Enumeration,"4  ^the apportionment debate in the Second 
Congress ended.
44House Journal, 4: 170-71. See Appendix 1, roll call
16.
45Ibid., 4: 175-76. See Appendix 1, roll call 17. 
4®Senate Journal, 4: 178; Annals of Congress. 3, 1359.
CHAPTER 6
ANALYSIS OF THE ROLL CALL RECORD
Two basic assumptions must be made with cluster bloc 
analysis.1 The first is that representatives will vote as 
they believe. In other words, a representative's vote on a 
particular issue indicates that representative's true 
position on the issue--with occasional exceptions made for 
political maneuvering and expediency. The second basic 
assumption is that representatives who vote together will 
have some common feature and can therefore be grouped into 
voting blocs that give some meaningful indicator of causal 
factors. Such blocs may indicate degrees of sectional or 
party unity or disunity, coalitions between and within 
sections and parties, factionalism within regions or 
parties, or any number of other combinations.
In cluster bloc analysis, the absence of voting is as 
important as voting itself. For example, if a Northern
lMy discussion of the techniques involved in Rice-Byele Cluster Bloc Analysis is taken from Lee F. Anderson,Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative 
Roll Call Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1966), 56-74; Richard Beringer, Historical Analysis: 
Contemporary Approaches to Clio's Craft (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), 287-93; Charles M. Dollar and Richard 
J. Jensen, Historian's Guide to Statistics: Quantitative 
Analysis in Historical Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, Inc., 1971), 106-109, 214-23; David B. Truman, The Congressional Party: A Case Study (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959), 45-48.
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representative were not to vote for a specific piece of 
legislation that other members of his section supported, 
that representative's absence is significant. By not 
voting, that representative's actions could be perceived as 
a protest against that specific piece of legislation, his 
party, his coalition within the party, or perhaps his 
section. On the other hand, lack of a vote may indicate an 
attempt to dodge an issue, or that the legislator was ill, 
away from the capital, or away from his seat for reasons 
that have nothing to do with politics. If several 
representatives fail to vote either yea or nay on an issue 
or a set of related issues, however, those representatives 
may be placed in their own bloc.
Cluster bloc analysis also provides the researcher with 
a tool to determine the opinions of the many representatives 
who failed to speak in regular session, the Committee of the 
Whole, or in Committee. If a representative casts a vote, 
or in certain instances does not, that representative is 
expressing an opinion on an issue. Since most 
representatives do not actually speak on the floor of the 
House of Representatives, the researcher can garner what 
that representative's opinion may have been. If historians 
fail to examine the legislative voting record, they will 
study the elite and garrulous only, and it is more than 
likely that they could ignore the contribution of the 
majority of representatives.
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Rice-Beyle Cluster-Bloc Analysis, the type of 
legislative roll call analysis utilized here, involves a 
standard set of procedures. The first step in cluster bloc 
analysis is the selection of roll calls to be analyzed. For 
this paper, seventeen roll calls from the First Session, 
Second House of Representatives were selected. Each of 
these roll calls dealt specifically with the apportionment 
of representation in the House of Representation. Appendix 
1 contains a complete listing of these roll calls, as well 
as a description of the measure, issue, vote, result, and 
probable attitudinal position a Congressman would hold 
regarding that roll call. Appendix 2 contains a listing of 
each section's vote on the apportionment roll calls.2
The second step in cluster bloc analysis involves 
calculating the extent of agreement between representatives. 
A cluster bloc computer program provides an index of 
agreement for each possible pair of representatives.3 This 
simple measure of agreement is the percentage of times that 
two representatives voted the same way on the chosen set of 
roll calls. The pair-wise indexes of agreement are then
2When selecting roll calls to be analyzed, it is 
important to cross-check the information presented in the 
Voting Records with the actual debates in the Annals of 
Congress and the Journal of the House of Representatives, as 
discrepancies in the Voting Records are often present.
3The computer program utilized in this paper is found 
in Cluster Bloc Analysis, unpublished computer program by 
Jarvis Ehart and Richard Beringer, University of North Dakota, 1972. The Ehart and Beringer program is a 
modification of the cluster bloc program found in Anderson, Watts, and Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis, chapter 
4 .
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placed in a matrix like the one in Appendix 4. Blocs are 
formed among the representatives with the highest levels of 
agreement. Those with the highest level of agreement are 
placed at the top of the matrix, while those with lower 
levels of agreement are placed progressively lower in the 
matrix. For example, Abraham Baldwin of Georgia voted for 
each measure that would have increased the size of the House 
of Representatives.4 To fall into the same bloc as Baldwin, 
a representative would have to have voted in agreement with 
Baldwin on at least 70 percent of the twelve selected roll 
calls. This is an arbitrary threshold, and may vary from 
study to study, but it has been proven to be compatible with 
the data in this study. Requiring a threshold that is too 
high tends to lead to the conclusion that there were no 
blocs at all, much as high water levels do not reveal the 
rocks and reefs. Criteria that are too low would mislead 
the reader into believing that there was relatively little 
disagreement among Congressmen--there would be nothing but 
rocks and reefs. The conventional threshold in this sort of 
research is between 70 percent and 80 percent. Given the 
rudimentary nature of factional development in the early 
1790s, we are justified in using the lower conventional 
criteria.
4For the roll call data pertaining to the Second House, refer to the Inter-University Consortium for Political and 
Social Research, United States Congressional Roll Call 
Voting Records, 2 House, 1791-1793, machine readable 
records, ICPSR 0004 (hereinafter cited as Voting Records).
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Rarely will all representatives fall into the same 
bloc. This would indicate there was no disagreement in the 
legislative body, but members will argue. Moreover, if a 
representative agrees with at least 50 percent of the bloc 
members, but not all of them, that representative is 
considered a "fringe" member. Those representatives who are 
neither bloc nor fringe members, but who agree with at least 
one other representative at least 70 percent of the time are 
"isolates." If the index of agreement between two 
representatives is less than 70 percent, a zero is 
substituted in the matrix for the index of agreement. That 
zero does not imply that there was no agreement between the 
two representatives. Instead, it simply signifies that the 
level of frequency of agreement between them failed to break 
the minimum threshold of 70 percent and therefore one or 
both is not to be considered a bloc or fringe member for our 
purposes.
Cluster bloc analysis of the apportionment roll calls 
in the Second Congress indicates a great deal about 
sectionalism's role in the apportionment debate. The entire 
membership of the First Session of the Second House was 
analyzed and three sectional blocs were found: a Southern 
bloc, a New England bloc, and a Mid-Atlantic bloc. There 
are two possible conclusions that can be drawn from that 
analysis. First, Southern representatives united against 
representatives from the North (New England and Mid-Atlantic 
states) to support an increase in the size of the House of
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Representatives. And within the North, there was a distinct 
division between the New England states and the Mid-Atlantic 
states. The second, and less explanatory conclusion, is 
that the apportionment debate saw an East-West sectionalism. 
This theory would suggest that the states without a large 
western frontier (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, New Hampshire, Delaware, New Jersey, and Maryland) 
opposed the states with a large frontier (Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia). The states with the 
large western frontiers could look forward to the day when 
increased settlement would automatically increase their 
representation. The other states would not have that 
expectation.
Under the Constitution's apportionment clause, the five 
Southern states, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Georgia, had a total of twenty-nine 
representatives between them. Table 6 shows that 52 percent
Table 6
Distribution of Southern 
Representatives in Southern Bloc and Fringe 
(Percents calculated by rows)
Number of Bloc FringeState Members Members MembersMaryland 6 1 (17%) 3 (50%)Virginia 10 9 (90%) 1 (10%)North Carolina 5 1 (20%) 3 (60%)
South Carolina 5 2 (40%) 1 (20%)
Georgia 3 2 (67%) 1 (33%)
Total of Bloc/Fringe 4 (67%)
10 (1 0 0 %)4 (80%)
3 (60%)
3 (100%)
Total 29 15 (52%) 9 (31%) 24 (83%)
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of Southern representatives in the House voted in a single 
bloc, while 31 percent of them were on the fringe of that 
bloc. Out of a total of twenty-nine representatives, 83 
percent voted with their section on the seventeen 
apportionment roll calls held in the Second Congress.
The matrixes of the Southern, New England, and Mid-Atlantic 
blocs and fringes can be found in Appendix 4.
It is possible to account for the five Southern 
representatives who were not in the Southern bloc or fringe. 
For example, John Mercer of Maryland failed to vote on the 
minimum twelve roll calls to be eligible for membership.in 
the matrix. While I mentioned earlier that absence from 
voting is in itself a voting behavior, Mercer's absences 
cannot be attributed to his opposition to the rest of his 
section. Mercer took his seat in the House on 6 February 
1792 to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of his 
predecessor, William Pinkney. Pinkney had resigned in 
November 1791 over questions surrounding his residence and 
eligibility to serve as a representative from Maryland. 
Mercer was not present for the first fifteen roll calls cast 
in the Second House. He was, however, present for four of 
the apportionment roll calls. On those four occasions, he 
voted with his Southern colleagues each time.5
5lbid.; Congress, Senate, Biographical Directory of the 
United States Congress 1774-1989. 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1989. S. Doc. 100-34, 53 (hereinafter cited as Biographical 
Directory).
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Upton Sheridine, also of Maryland, was also not in the 
Southern bloc or fringe. But Sheridine voted on only 21 of 
the 102 roll calls in the entire Second House. Absence on 
79 percent of the roll calls for a particular Congress does 
not justify considering those absences as significant 
behavior for roll call analysis. However, of the twenty-one 
votes that Sheridine did cast, seven were on apportionment 
roll calls. Of those seven votes, Sheridine voted with the 
Southern bloc members on six times, suggesting that he was 
leaning heavily toward support of the Southern position.6 
Additionally, the fact that one-third of the roll calls that 
he actively participated in were over the apportionment 
issue suggests the importance of that debate for his 
section.
Two representatives from South Carolina failed to vote 
in either the Southern bloc or fringe. The first case, 
William L. Smith, is a useful example of an isolate. Smith 
voted at least 70 percent agreement with five Southern bloc 
or fringe members: John Ashe of North Carolina at 79 
percent, Samuel Sterett of Maryland at 75 percent, Nathaniel 
Macon of North Carolina at 73 percent, and William Barry 
Grove of North Carolina and Daniel Huger of South Carolina 
at 71 percent. As such, Smith cannot be completely ruled 
out as a supporter of the Southern position.
6Votinq Records.
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Robert Barnwell was the second of South Carolina's 
representatives who failed to appear in the Southern bloc or 
fringe. However, he was an isolate with both William L. 
Smith of South Carolina and Philip Key of Maryland. Of the 
seventeen roll calls examined, Barnwell sided with the South 
nine times and with the New England bloc eight times. It 
appears as if his political loyalties on the apportionment 
issue were divided. One can only suppose that perhaps 
Barnwell opposed any large increase in the number of 
representatives on political or social ground. Perhaps more 
analysis of Barnwell's writings would hold the answer to his 
position on the representation issue.
An additional Southern representative failed to appear 
in the Southern bloc or fringe. John Steele of North 
Carolina cast only twelve votes on the apportionment roll 
calls. However, Steele actively participated in the 
majority of the remaining roll calls in the Second House.
On the twelve apportionemnt roll calls that Steele voted on, 
he was in agreement with his fellow Southerners only five 
times. But on those same twelve roll calls, he voted with 
the New England bloc six times. While at first perplexing, 
Steele's behavior makes more sense when the debates in the 
House are examined. Steele was one of the most vocal 
critics of a dramatic increase in the number of 
representatives, and stated as much on 10 November 1791 on 
the floor of the House. Additionally, biographical data on 
Steele suggest that he was a supporter of the Federalist
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Party later in his career.7 Perhaps Steele chose to abstain 
from a number of votes that he felt would put him in 
opposition to his Southern colleagues. However, the votes 
he did cast pushed his membership toward the New England 
bloc.
But even with the failure of Steele and Barnwell to 
vote with the Southern bloc and fringe, 83 percent of 
Southern representatives in the Second Congress favored 
increasing the size of the House of Representatives. After 
we consider that two of the five Southern representatives 
not in the Southern bloc or fringe can be accounted for by 
not being present in the House at the time of the debate, 
the percentage of Southerners in the single bloc and fringe 
increases to 89 percent.
A similar analysis of the voting patterns of the 
representatives from New England shows a discernible bloc 
diametrically opposed to the Southern bloc and fringe. For 
example, Nicholas Gilman of New Hampshire voted exactly 
opposite to Abraham Baldwin on every representation roll 
call. I noted earlier that Baldwin was one of the South's 
most ardent supporters of an increase in the size of the 
House. Therefore, Gilman's votes can be used as a standard 
by which to judge New England's opposition to an increase in 
the size of the House.8 An analysis of the roll calls
7Bioqraphical Directory, 1865. 
8Votinq Records.
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indicates that the majority of New England's representatives 
agreed with Gilman. A total of 58 percent of New England's 
representatives voted in the same bloc as Gilman. Likewise, 
21 percent of the representatives from New England were on 
the fringe of that bloc. Thus, as table 7 reveals, a
Table 7
Distribution of New England Representatives in New England Bloc and Fringe 
(Percents calculated by rows)
Number of Bloc Fringe Total ofState Members Members Members Bloc/FrinaeVermont 2 2 (100%) - 2 (100%)New Hampshire 3 3 (100%) - 3 (100%)Massachusetts 8 4 (50%) 2 (25%) 6 (75%)Connecticut 5 1 (20%) 2 (40%) 3 (60%)
Rhode Island 1 1 (100%) 1 (100%)
Total 19 11 (58%) 4 (21%) 15 (79%)
substantial total of 79 percent of the representatives from 
New England were part of either a bloc or a fringe with the 
other members of that section.
But not all of the representatives from New England 
fell into the New England bloc and fringe. However, like 
most of the Southern representatives who were not part of 
the Southern bloc and fringe, the absence of similar 
representatives from New England can be explained. For 
example, George Leonard of Massachusetts was not even 
present in the House during the apportionment debate;
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Leonard did not take his seat until after the debate had 
ended.9
Jonathan Trumball of Connecticut did not actively 
participate in the apportionment debate in the whole Second 
House. In fact, of the 102 roll calls held during the 
Second Congress, Trumbull voted yea or nay only 5 times. Of 
those five votes, only one was cast in the first session and 
that vote had nothing to do with the apportionment debate.10 
But Trumball was Speaker of the House, and the Speaker 
rarely voted unless to make a special point or to break a 
tie.
James Hillhouse of Connecticut was a semi-active member 
of the House during the representation debate. But he 
failed to vote with his fellow representatives from New 
England. However, he did vote as an isolate with Robert 
Barnwell of South Carolina and Andrew Gregg of Pennsylvania.
The only representative from New England who voted 
consistently against his section was Elbridge Gerry of 
Massachusetts. One will recall that as early as the 
Constitutional Convention Gerry had favored an increase in 
the size of the House of Representatives. Yet, he failed to 
side completely with the South on the apportionment issue in 
the Second Congress. Of the seventeen roll calls analyzed, 
Gerry cast votes on only twelve.11 It is likely that rather
9 Ibid.
lOlbid.
11Ibid.
95
than alienate the members of his section, Gerry abstained 
from casting votes against their position. On the twelve 
roll calls he voted on, he managed to agree with his fellow 
New Englanders seven times, thus denying him a place in the 
New England bloc or fringe. Thus, if we remove Leonard and 
Trumbull from our calculations as inactive voters, the 
percentage of representatives from New England voting in a 
single bloc and fringe increases 10 percent to 89 percent.
Gerry was not the only Northern representative who 
abstained from voting on a significant number of roll calls. 
Several representatives from the Mid-Atlantic states (New 
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Delaware) abstained from 
voting on several of the apportionment roll calls that so 
clearly divided the South from New England.12 The same 
analysis that was used to determine the New England and 
Southern blocs and fringes shows that representatives from 
the Mid-Atlantic states also voted in a discernible bloc and 
fringe, distinct from the Southern and New England Blocs. 
Table 8 shows that six of the nineteen members (32 percent) 
from the Mid-Atlantic states voted in the same bloc. Two 
(11 percent) of the representatives from the same states 
were on the fringe of that bloc.
12lbid.
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Table 8
Distribution of Mid-Atlantic Representatives 
in Mid-Atlantic Bloc and Fringe 
(Percents calculated by rows)
Number of Bloc Fringe Total ofState Members Members Members Bloc/FrinaeNew Jersey 4 - 1 (25%) 1 (25%)New York 6 2 (33%) 1 (17%) 3 (50%)Pennsylvania 8 4 (50%) - 4 (50%)Delaware 1 — — —
Total 19 6 (32%) 2 (11%) 8 (42%)
The Mid-Atlantic position on the apportionment roll 
calls was closer to that of New England's that to that of 
the South. As Appendix 2 shows, on the seventeen 
representation roll calls, the Mid-Atlantic states sided 
with the New England states ten times. On four of the roll 
calls they voted with the Southern representatives. But on 
the three roll calls dealing with the census, many of the 
representatives from the Mid-Atlantic states abstained from 
voting. The representatives from New Jersey and Delaware 
could expect little increase in representation in future 
Congresses resulting from an increase in their states' 
population.
Membership in the Mid-Atlantic and New England blocs 
and fringes was not mutually exclusive. For example, Amasa 
Learned of Connecticut was a member of both the Mid-Atlantic 
and New England blocs. Jeremiah Wadsworth, also of 
Connecticut was a member of both the New England bloc and 
the Mid-Atlantic fringe. Of the four representatives from
97
New Jersey, only one of them, Abraham Clark, was in the Mid- 
Atlantic fringe while the remaining representatives from New 
Jersey fell into the New England bloc and fringe. The 
significance of that voting breakdown will be discussed 
later.
Pennsylvania's representatives failed to unite into a 
single Mid-Atlantic bloc. In fact, two representatives from 
Pennsylvania, William Findley, a vocal supporter of an 
increase in the size of the House during the debates in the 
Committee of the Whole, and Frederick A.C. Muhlenberg, 
abandoned their fellow Northerners and voted within the 
Southern bloc.
Two other Pennsylvanians appear unaccounted for in the 
representation debate. One, Daniel Heister, voted on only 
nine of the seventeen roll calls. Of those nine roll calls, 
six votes were in common with the Southern bloc, five were 
in agreement with the Mid-Atlantic bloc, and only three 
matched the New England position.13 With such limited 
information, Heister's voting record cannot be used to 
accurately determine any position other than perhaps 
opposition to the New England position. Andrew Gregg, the 
other missing Pennsylvania representative, can be accounted 
for as an isolate. A breakdown of the vote showed that 
Hillhouse of Connecticut voted in agreement on enough issues 
with Gregg for the two to become isolates.
13lbid.
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John Vining, Delaware's representative in the House, 
failed to vote on enough issues to appear in any of the 
blocs.14 But it will be remembered that Vining continually 
argued during the debates in the Committee of the Whole for 
an increase in at least Delaware's representation in the 
House.
New York's representatives, like those of Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey, failed to commit to the Mid-Atlantic blocs 
en masse. Of New York's six representatives in the House, 
three were members of the Mid-Atlantic bloc or fringe. 
Cornelius Schoonmaker, like Vining, failed to vote on enough 
roll calls to be a member of any bloc.15 John Laurance, as 
expected after all his efforts in the Committee of the Whole 
to increase the size of the House, voted with the Southern 
bloc. Meanwhile, Thomas Tredwell's voting pattern put him 
very close to the Southern fringe. Tredwell was an isolate 
with seven of the sixteen Southern bloc members.
Undoubtedly, Tredwell's interests were with his Southern 
colleagues and not with his fellow representatives from the 
North.
While a North-South division on the apportionment issue 
appears obvious, we must consider the possibility that the 
sectional division over the apportionment debate was between 
the East and the West as opposed to the North and the South.
14lbid.
15lbid.
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The East was those states without a large western frontier 
into which their populations would expand. Therefore, we 
must consider all of New England, plus Delaware, New Jersey, 
and Maryland as Eastern states. Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and Georgia, with their large western 
frontiers, were the Western states. New York and 
Pennsylvania did not have extensive western boundaries in 
the early 1790, but they still had large areas of land 
within the states open to settlement. Therefore, their 
interests would lie with a Western bloc.
The Eastern position would oppose any dramatic increase 
in the size of the House of Representatives. Conversely, 
the Western states would favor such an increase as they 
would certainly benefit from any reapportionments based on 
proportional representation. It logically follows that all 
of New England would fall in the Eastern bloc and all of the 
South, except Maryland, would fall in the Western bloc. 
Moreover, Pennsylvania and New York would vote with the 
Western (Southern) bloc.
But analysis of the roll call record reveals that 
Maryland abandoned Eastern solidarity to vote with the 
Western bloc. Undoubtedly, the representatives from 
Maryland viewed Southern sectional unity as more vital to 
their interests than Eastern unity.
The voting behavior of the Mid-Atlantic states also 
challenges the contention of a East-West sectional division 
on the apportionment issue. First, we must remember that
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Pennsylvania refused to ratify the apportionment amendment 
that would have surely increased its apportionment of 
representatives. Second, why did only three (16 percent) of 
New York's and Pennsylvania’s representatives vote with the 
Western bloc? If an East-West division was present, does it 
not follow that more than 16 percent of those 
representatives would have voted in the Western bloc? If we 
consider that only two (25 percent) of Pennsylvania's 
representatives voted with the Western bloc while four (50 
percent) voted against that bloc and with the Mid-Atlantic 
bloc, we see that the sectional orientation of 
Pennsylvanians was definitely more North-South than East- 
West. Moreover, three (50 percent) of New York's 
representatives voted against the Western bloc and for the 
Mid-Atlantic bloc (see table 9).
New Jersey's voting behavior just as likely suggests a 
North-South division as it suggests an East-West 
sectionalism. Regarding the representation ratio in 1791, 
one can justifiably presume that New Jersey would oppose any 
increase in the number of members in the House. During the 
Constitutional Convention, the New Jersey delegation was the 
most vocal critic of a large House of Representatives. Only 
after the Great Compromise was the New Jersey delegation's 
demands placated. Thus, it is no surprise that in 1791 New 
Jersey's representatives in the government would have 
favored limiting the number of representatives in the House.
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Table 9
Distribution and Percentage of Representatives 
in East and West Blocs and Fringes
Number of East East West WestState Members Bloc Frinae Bloc FrinaeVermont 2 2 (100%) - - -New Hampshire 3 3 (100%) - - -
Massachusetts 8 4 (50%) 2 (25%) - -Connecticut 5 1 (20%) 2 (40%) - —Rhode Island 1 1 (100%) - -
19 11 (58%) 4 (21%) - -
New Jersey 4 3 (75%) 1 (25%) — —New York 6 - - 1 (16%) -Pennsylvania 8 - - 2 (25%) -Delaware 1 — — — —
19 3 (16%) 1 (5%) 3 (16%) -
Maryland 6 — — 1 (17%) 3 (50%)Virginia 10 - - 9 (90%) 1 (10%)
North Carolina 5 - - 1 (20%) 3 (60%)South Carolina 5 - - 2 (40%) -Georgia 3 - - 2 (67%) 1 (33%)
29 - - 15 (52%) 8 (28%)
Total 65 14 (22%) 5 18 (28%) 8 (12%)
Therefore, what is the significance of the voting
patterns on the apportionment issue? Clearly, the South and 
New England divided along North-South sectional lines in 
opposition on the representation issue in the Second House.
A total of 80 percent of all Southerners voted in a single 
bloc and fringe. Meanwhile, 79 percent of New England's 
representatives voted in their own distinct--and opposing-- 
bloc and fringe. Additionally, no representatives from the 
South or New England completely abandoned their section to
102
vote with the other section. John Steele’s votes, while 
putting him close to the New England position, were not so 
contrary to the Southern position as to reflect a complete 
break with his section.
The voting behavior of the Mid-Atlantic states also 
points to a North-South sectional division on the 
representation issue. Fifteen (79 percent) of the 
Representatives from the Mid-Atlantic states voted solidly 
against the Southern position. Only 16 percent of the 
representatives from the Mid-Atlantic states fell within the 
Southern bloc. An additional representative, Tredwell of 
New York, was close to belonging to the Southern bloc as a 
fringe member. Even including Tredwell as a potential 
Southern sympathizer on the apportionment issue, only 21 
percent of the Mid-Atlantic representatives voted with the 
Southern bloc as opposed to 79 percent who voted just as 
solidly against it. East-West considerations may have been 
in the back of the minds of some the Congressmen, but not 
enough to detect by cluster bloc analysis.
The question arises as to the degree of sectionalism 
within the North between the Mid-Atlantic states and New 
England. The fact that seven representatives from the Mid- 
Atlantic states voted in a single bloc and fringe opposed to 
the New England states is significant. What is even more 
significant is that all seven of those representatives were 
from New York and Pennsylvania. The fact that 50 percent of 
the representatives from Pennsylvania and New York, the two
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largest and most influential Mid-Atlantic states, voted as a 
mini-bloc surely indicates a significant degree of 
sectionalism.
Of all the representatives who failed to vote within 
their section's bloc or fringe, only Laurance and Tredwell 
of New York and Findley and Muhlenberg of Pennsylvania, 
totally abandoned the North for the South. But none of the 
four representatives were from the states holding either the 
extreme New England or Southern positions.
Thus, an analysis of the roll call data pertaining to 
the apportionment debate in the Second Congress proves my 
hypothesis. The South did unite against the North to favor 
a large increase in the size of the House of 
Representatives. But within the North, two distinct voting 
blocs emerged. One coalition consisted of the New England 
states and New Jersey. The other bloc was comprised of the 
largest Mid-Atlantic states: New York and Pennsylvania. The 
Mid-Atlantic states, while solidly against the Southern 
position of any measure to radically increase the size of 
the House, failed to reach a consensus with their Northern 
colleagues. As a result, a division between New England the 
Mid-Atlantic states emerged.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
From 1787 until 1792 American statesmen debated the 
representation issue. The delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention in the summer of 1787 struggled with the question 
of slavery's role in the apportionment of representatives to 
the national legislature. Coupled with the debate 
surrounding the merits of a bicameral legislature, the 
representation issue almost brought the Convention to an 
end. But the Convention reached a compromise. On the basis 
of both the three-fifths clause and the Great Compromise, 
representation in the House of Representatives would be 
apportioned at a ratio of not more than one representative 
for each thirty thousand persons.
In the state ratifying conventions the representation 
issue was a point of contention between the Anti-Federalist 
critics of the Constitution and its Federalist supporters. 
The Anti-Federalists claimed that the Constitution's 
apportionment provisions fixing the representation ratio at 
not more than one representative for each thirty thousand 
persons would unnecessarily limit the size of the House of 
Representatives. A House limited in number, they argued, 
could not guarantee the peoples' liberties. Therefore, the
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number of representatives in the House should be increased. 
However, the Federalist supporters of the Constitution 
contended that a limited number of representatives in the 
House would prevent the emergence of the tyranny of the 
legislative majority. Additionally, they stressed that any 
increase in the House would burden the people with 
unnecessary costs for maintaining the Congress.
The Federalists won the ratification contest in 1788 
when New Hampshire, as the ninth state to do so, ratified 
the Constitution. But the Anti-Federalists took heart in 
the proposed constitutional amendments submitted by several 
of that state ratifying conventions. Six of the ratifying 
conventions, those in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Virginia, New York, and North Carolina, suggested 
a constitutional amendment to change the apportionment 
provisions to allow for a more drastic increase in the 
number of representatives in the House.
James Madison, one of the Constitution's framers and 
earliest supporters, brought the representation issue to the 
floor of the First Congress. Madison understood that a 
significant number of Americans remained critical of the 
Constitution on the ground that not only did it not contain 
a Bill of Rights, but that it limited representation in the 
House of Representatives. He therefore offered the House of 
Representatives a list of constitutional amendments 
addressing those grievances.
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By September 1789 the House of Representatives and the 
Senate had agreed on a final list of twelve proposed 
constitutional amendments to be submitted to the states.
The first of those amendments was an apportionment amendment 
that would have significantly increased the size of the 
House of Representatives. The second of those amendments 
prohibited the Congress from granting itself a mid-term pay 
raise. But when submitted to the states, the first two 
amendments failed to pass the required three-fourths of the 
states for ratification. Only seven states ratified the 
proposed First Amendment. When Virginia ratified amendments 
III thorough XII, they became the first ten amendments to 
the Constitution--the Bill of Rights.
When the Second Congress convened in late 1791, the 
representation issue remained unsettled. The representation 
debate surrounded the representation ratio and the size of 
future House of Representatives. In October 1791, 
Representative John Laurance proposed a settlement of the 
issue of the representation ratio. He submitted a 
resolution to the House calling for a reapportionment of 
representatives at a ratio of one representative for every 
thirty thousand persons. Thereafter, from October 1791 
until April 1792, the representation ratio was the topic of 
near continuous debate in the Congress.
In the House of Representatives the apportionment 
debate became a contest between North and South. The South, 
with a larger population, could expect to gain more
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representatives than the North if there were a new 
apportionment at a lower representation ratio. At the same 
time, the New England states came to oppose any measure that 
would lead to an increase in the size of the House.
Finally, after three different bills and a presidential 
veto, President Washington signed an apportionment bill into 
law with a representation ratio of one representatives for 
every thirty-three thousand persons. Representation was 
reapportioned on the basis of the apportionment law in time 
for the Third Congress. The number of members in the House 
increased from sixty-five to one hundred and five.l As 
expected, the South gained by far the most representatives.
The proposed First Amendment remained unratified by the 
states and has subsequently been relegated to the status of 
a footnote in history, when mentioned at all. In contrast, 
in 1992, two hundred years after the fact, three-fourths of 
the states finally ratified the proposed Second Amendment. 
Meanwhile, the Bill of Rights became the basis for the 
American peoples' personal liberties and freedoms.
The implications of the apportionment debate were 
limited in the early 1790s. The reapportionment of 
representation on the basis of a representation ratio of one 
representative for every thirty-three thousand persons 
changed little. No major changes occurred in the power
lUnder the Apportionment Act of 1929, the number of 
representatives in the House was fixed at 435. Jay M. 
Shafritz, The Dorsey Dictionary of American Government and 
Politics (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1988), 29.
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structure of Washington's administrations. Decision making 
remained firmly settled in the President, his cabinet, and 
Congress. The House was Southern dominated, but not more 
demagogic than before. The period was still centered on the 
confrontation between the Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians in 
Washington's cabinet, not between the North and the South.
However, the apportionment debate brought an early 
sectional conflict to the fore of American politics. Even 
before the rift between the New England Federalists and the 
Southern Jeffersonian-Republicans that emerged during the 
Quasi-War with France and the Election of 1800, it was clear 
that the two sections held significantly different views on 
both the government and the American people. This was true 
even if some early tensions on the slavery issue were 
ignored.
One can only imagine the chaos that would be the House 
of Representatives if the apportionment amendment had 
passed. Supposing a population of two hundred and fifty 
million today, after the Census of 1990, the House would be 
comprised of over five thousand representatives. With the 
gridlock that paralyses the House today, we can only long 
for leaders and statesmen as reasonable and dedicated as 
both the Federalists and Anti-Federalists of the early 
years.
As with any work, during the research and writing of 
this paper certain unanswered guestions emerged that should 
be examined by future researchers. The most basic guestion
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is how consistently did the New England and Southern states 
vote as blocs in the House of Representatives during 
Washington's administrations? Did the issue of the militia 
bill, relations with the Indians on the western frontier, or 
reactions to the French Revolution divide the House along 
sectional lines? Was a North-South sectionalism therefore a 
more common feature of national politics in the early 1790s 
than has generally been acknowledged?
Another important question that requires attention 
centers on the lack of private debate surrounding the 
apportionment issue after the failure of the apportionment 
amendment. Although the representation issue was heartily 
debated in both the Constitutional Convention and the state 
ratifying conventions, why did that debate fail to capture 
the public's imagination during the debates in the First and 
Second Congress. After 1789 the apportionment debate was 
centered primarily in the House of Representatives. Almost 
nothing was written of the proposed first amendment or the 
apportionment bills that were debated in the Congress.
Could it be that the general population perceived the 
representation issue as one that affected them less than 
more pressing issues of taxation, banking, possible war, and 
Indian relations?
The role of the New England states in the rest of the 
Federalist Era brings to the surface the most intriguing 
question surrounding the apportionment debate, one that may 
well be unanswerable. Almost as a unit the representatives
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from New England voted in true Hamiltonian fashion to oppose 
an increase in the size of the House. Was the apportionment 
issue the beginning of the solid alignment of New England 
against the eventual Federalist Party? Can the New England 
voting bloc on the apportionment debate from 1790 through 
1792 be viewed as the beginning of the core New England 
support of the Federalist Party?
A final question remained of interest to me as I wrote 
this paper. Trying to place the representation debate in 
the context of the entire Federalist Era, I wondered what 
impact that New England's intransigeance on an issue in.the 
House of Representatives had on the eventual success of the 
Jeffersonian-Republicans. Certainly the Revolution of 1800 
was a result of the failures of Adams's administration and 
was not a direct result of New England's opposition to an 
increase in the size of the House. But is it not possible 
that the representation debate showed New England, and by 
implication, the Federalists' true sentiments about the 
masses? Did many future Jeffersonian-Republican realize for 
the first time that they possessed a distinctly different 
outlook on politics than the Federalists? Future party 
allegiance is therefore a question that future researchers 
ought to examine. In short, was the representation debate 
from 1787 through 1792 an isolated instance of sectionalism, 
or merely one of the first steps in a long and drawn out 
sectional conflict between the North and the South?
APPENDIX 1
LIST OF ROLL CALLS
Roll Call 1: Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote: 
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
15 November 1791
To pass the resolution submitted by- John Laurance of New York establishing a representation ratio 
of one representative for each 
thirty thousand persons.The resolution would set the 
representation ratio at one 
representative for each thirty thousand persons.
Yea 25, nay 23. The resolution 
passes.
Until the next enumeration, the 
representation ratio will be set at 
one representative for each thirty 
thousand persons.
Annals of Congress, p. 191; House 
Journal, pp. 30-31.
H021001
Card 1, column 33 
A yea vote would be cast by a 
Congressman who favored a large 
representation in the House.
Roll Call 2: 
Date:Measure:
Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location:
23 November 1791 To amend H.R. 147, a bill to 
apportion representation according 
to the first enumeration, so that 
the representation ratio is one to 
thirty-four thousand.The amendment would establish a 
representation ratio of one to thirty-four thousand.
Yea 21, nay 38. The amendment 
fails.
H.R. 147 continues to have a 
representation ratio of one to 
thirty thousand.
Annals of Congress, p. 208; House 
Journal, pp. 37-38.
H021002
Card 1, column 34
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Attitudinal position: A nay vote would be cast by a
Congressman who hoped to see a larger increase in the size of the House.
Roll Call 3: 
Date:Measure: Issue:
Vote: Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
24 November 1791 To pass H.R. 147.
The bill would establish a 
representation ratio of one to 
thirty thousand as law.Yea 43, nay 12
An apportionment bill with a 
representation ratio of one to 
thirty thousand passes the House. 
Annals of Congress, p. 210; House 
Journal, p. 40.
H021003
Card 1, column 35 
A yea vote would be cast by a 
Congressman who favored a large 
increase in the size of the House.
Roll Call 4: Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote: 
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
14 December 1791
To agree to an amendment to H.R. 
146 submitted by John Vining of 
Delaware that would set the number of representatives in the House at 
a fixed number instead of at a 
ratio of one to thirty-three thousand.
Vining's amendment would limit the 
number of representatives in the House.
Yea 27, nay 37. The amendment 
fails.
H.R. 147 continues to keep a 
representation ratio of one to 
thirty-three thousand.
Annals of Congress, p. 250; House
Journal, pp. 54-55H021004
Card 1, column 36 
A nay vote would be cast by a 
Congressman who opposed limiting the size of the House.
Roll Call 5:
Date: 14 December 1791
Measure: A vote to agree with the Senateamendment to H.R. 147 that would 
have set the representation ratio at one to thirty-three thousand.
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Issue:
Vote: 
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
The apportionment bill would 
contain a representation ratio of 
one to thirty-three thousand and 
therefore limit the increase in 
the number of members in the House. 
Yea 29, nay 31. The amendment fails.
The Senate and the House must 
compromise on a representation ratio.
Annals of Congress, p. 251; House Journal, pp. 55-56.H021004
Card 1, column 37 
A nay vote would be cast by a 
Congressmen who opposed limiting the increase in the size of the 
House of Representatives.
Roll Call 6: 
Date:Measure:
Issue:
Vote: 
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
19 December 1791
To recede from the disagreement to 
the representation ratio of one to thirty-three thousand.
If this motioned passed, H.R. 147 
would have provided a 
representation ratio of one to 
thirty-three thousand.
Yea 27, nay 33. The motion fails. 
The House fails to accept the 
Senate version of the apportionment 
bill.
Annals of Congress, p. 251; House 
Journal, pp. 58-59.
H021006
Card 1, column 38 A nay vote would be cast by a 
Congressman who opposed limiting 
the increase in the House.
Roll Call 7: 
Date:Measure:
Issue:
Vote: 
Result:
Location:
19 December 1791To adhere to the House's earlier disagreement to the Senate's 
representation ratio of one to thirty-three thousand.
The apportionment bill would have 
contained a representation ratio of 
one to thirty-three thousand if the 
motion failed.
Yea 32, nay 27
The House and the Senate are unable 
to agree on a representation ratio. 
Annals of Congress, p. 274; House
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Journal, pp. 59-60.
ICPSR variable number: H021007
ICPSR location: Card 1, column 39
Attitudinal position: A yea vote would be cast by a
Congressman who opposed limiting 
the size of the House.
Roll Call 8: 
Date:Measure:
Issue:
Vote: 
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: Attitudinal position:
24 January 1792To agree to an amendment submitted by Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey 
that would remove the section of the apportionment resolution 
calling for a second enumeration. 
The resolution would keep the 
population figures used in 
apportionment calculations static. 
Yea 22, nay 36. The amendment 
fails.
The new apportionment bill would 
contain mention of a second 
enumeration.
Annals of Congress, p. 336; House Journal, pp. 83-84.
H021012
Card 1, column 44 
A yea vote would be cast by a 
Congressman who opposed limiting 
the increase in the number of 
representatives in the House.
Roll Call 9: 
Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote: 
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: Attitudinal position:
24 January 1792
An amendment to the resolution to prepare a new apportionment bill, 
submitted by Samuel Livermore of 
New Hampshire, removing the phrase 
"no greater ratio be reported than 
thirty thousand to one."
The amendment would allow 
representation ratios greater than 
one to thirty thousand to be 
reported in the apportionment bill. 
Yea 33, nay 26. The amendment 
passes.
In the new apportionment bill a 
representation ratio greater than 
one to thirty thousand can be 
reported.
Annals of Congress, p. 336; House 
Journal, pp. 84-85.
H021013
Card 1, column 45 A yea vote would be cast by a
115
Congressman who favored limiting the increase in the size of the 
House of Representatives.
Roll Call 10: Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote: 
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: Attitudinal position:
20 February 1792
To amend H.R. 163 to strike out the 
portion of the resolution calling for a second enumeration.
The amendment would remove all 
mention of a second enumeration in 
the apportionment bill and 
therefore keep the population 
figures used for apportionment static.
Yea 23, nay 26. The amendment 
fails.
The apportionment bill will make 
provisions for a second enumeration 
on which to base apportionment. 
Annals of Congress, p. 415; House Journal, pp. 104-05.
H021019
Card 1, column 51 
A yea vote would be cast by a 
Congressman who favored limiting 
the increase in the size of the House.
Roll Call 11: 
Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote: 
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: Attitudinal position:
20 February 1792
An amendment to H.R. 163 submitted 
by Joshua Seney of Maryland to 
strike the section of the bill 
calling for a second enumeration.
If passed, the amendment would have 
removed the section of the 
apportionment bill calling for a 
second enumeration.
Yea 25, nay 26. The amendment 
fails.
The apportionment bill will contain provisions for a second 
enumeration.Annals of Congress, P. 416; House 
Journal, pp. 105-06.
H021020
Card 1, column 52 A nay vote would be cast by a 
Congressman who opposed limiting 
the size of the increase in the House.
Roll Call 12:
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Date: 
Measure:
Issue:
Vote: 
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: Attitudinal position:
20 February 1792
An amendment to H.R. 163 that sets 
the representation ratio at one to 
thirty thousand.
The new apportionment bill would contain a representation ratio of one to thirty thousand.
Yea 29, nay 22. The amendment passes.H.R. 163 will contain a 
representation ratio of one to thirty thousand.
Annals of Congress, p. 416; House Journal, pp. 106-07.
H021021
Card 1, column 53 
A yea vote would be cast by a 
Congressman who favored a larger 
increase in the size of the House 
of Representatives.
Roll Call 13: 
Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote: 
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: Attitudinal position:
21 February 1792 
To pass H.R. 163 
The apportionment law would 
apportion representation in time 
for the next Congress at a ratio of 
one representative for each thirty thousand persons.
Yea 34, nay 16. The bill passes. 
Pending the Senate's approval, 
representation will be 
apportioned at a ratio of one to 
thirty thousand in the Third 
Congress.
Annals of Congress, p. 418; House Journal, pp. 107-08.
H021023
Card 1, column 55 
A yea vote would be cast by a 
Congressman who favored a large 
increase in the House.
Roll Call 14:
Date: 17 March 1792
Measure: To pass an amendment to H.R. 179
that would set the number of 
Congressmen in the House at one 
hundred and twenty.Issue: Representation in the House would
not be based on any representation 
ratio.
Yea 30, nay 31. The amendment 
fails.
Vote:
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Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: Attitudinal position:
The number of representatives in 
the House will be apportioned 
according to a representation ratio.
Annals of Congress, p. 482; House Journal, pp. 137-38.H021034
Card 1, column 65 
A yea vote would be cast by a 
Congressman who favored limiting 
the number of representatives in 
the House or who beleived that one 
hundred and twenty representatives 
was an equitable compromise.
Roll Call 15: 
Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
23 March 1792
A motion submitted by Samuel 
Livermore of New Hampshire to 
recede from all disagreements to 
the Senate's amendments to H.R.
179.
The Senate's amendment dictates that the reapportionment in the 
House be made before the Fifth 
Congress and fixes the number of 
representatives.Yea 31, nay 29
H.R. 179, as amended by the Senate, passes the Congress.
Annals of Congress, p. 482; House 
Journal, pp. 146-47.
H021034
Card 1, column 67 
A nay vote would be cast by a 
Congressman who opposed limiting 
the size of the House.
Roll Call 16: 
Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location:
6 April 1792
To override President Washington's 
veto of H.R. 179.To pass the apportionment bill as amended by the Senate.
Yea 28, nay 33. The House is 
unable to override the President's veto.
New amendments must be submitted to 
H.R. 179 to comply with the 
President's veto message.
Annals of Congress, p. 541; House Journal, pp. 170-71.
H021046
Card 1, column 46
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Attitudinal position:
Roll Call 17: 
Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
A nay vote would be cast by a 
Congressman who opposed limiting 
the increase in the size of the House.
9 April 1792.
To amend H.R. 179 to apportion 
representation at a ratio of one to 
thirty-three thousand.
After 3 March 1793 the House will consist of members apportioned at a 
ratio of one to thirty-three thousand.Yea 34, nay 30.
Another apportionment bill passes 
the House.
Annals of Congress, p. 548; House Journal, pp. 175-76.
H021047
Card 1, column 80 
A yea vote would be cast by a 
Congressman who favored limiting 
the increase in the size of the 
House.
APPENDIX 2
ATTITUDINAL POSITION OF EACH BLOC ON 
REPRESENTATION ROLL CALLS1
Roll Southern New England Mid-AtlanticCall Vote Vote Vote1 yea nay yea2 nay yea nay3 yea nay yea4 nay yea yea5 nay yea yea6 nay yea yea7 yea nay nay8 nay yea nay9 nay yea yea10 nay yea abstain11 nay yea abstain12 yea nay abstain13 yea nay nay14 nay yea yea15 nay yea yea16 nay yea yea17 nay yea yea
llnter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, United States Congressional Roll Call Voting 
Records, 2 House, 1791-1793, machine readable records, ICPSR, 0004.
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APPENDIX 3
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE NEW ENGLAND BLOC AND FRINGE
New England Bloc
Fisher Ames (Massachusetts)
Elias Boudinot (New Jersey) 
Benjamin Bourn (Massachusetts) 
Sherjashub Bourne (Rhode Island) 
Abraham Clark (New Jersey) 
Nicholas Gilman (New Hampshire) 
Benjamin Goodhue (Massachusetts) Aaron Kitchell (New Jersey)Amasa Learned (Connecticut)
Samule Livermore (New Hampshire) 
Nathaniel Niles (Vermont)Isreal Smith (Vermont)
Jermiah Smith (New Hampshire) 
George Thacher (Massachusetts)
New England Fringe 
Jonathan Dayton (New Jersey) 
Theodore Sedgwick (Massachusetts) 
Jonathan Sturges (Connecticut) 
Artemus Ward (Massachusetts) 
Jeremiah Wadsworth (Connecticut)
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE MID-ATLANTIC BLOC AND FRINGE
Mid-Atlantic Bloc Egbert Benson (New York)
Thomas Fitzsimons (Pennsylvania) Thomas Hartley (Pennsylvania) Isreal Jacobs (Pennsylvania)John W. Kittera (Pennsylvania) 
Amasa Learned (Connecticut)
Peter Silvester (New York) 
Jeremiah Wadsworth (Connecticut)
Mid-Atlantic Bloc 
Abraham Clark (New Jersey) 
James Gordon (New York)
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APPENDIX 3 (con’t)
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE SOUTHERN BLOC AND FRINGE
Southern Bloc
Abraham Baldwin (Georgia)
John Brown (Virginia)
William Findley (Pennsylvania)
William B. Giles (Virginia)
Samuel Griffin (Virginia)
Daniel Huger (South Carolina)
Richard Bland Lee (Virginia)
Nathaniel Macon (North Carolina)
James Madison (Virginia)
Andrew Moore (Virginia)
Frederick A.C. Muhlenberg (Pennsylvania) 
John Page (Virginia)
Joshua Seney (Maryland)
Thomas Sumter (South Carolina)Abraham Venable (Virginia)
Alexander White (Virginia)
Francis Willis (Georgia)
Southern Fringe
John Ashe (North Carolina)
William Barry Grove (North Carolina) 
Philip Key (Maryland)
John Laurance (New York)
William Vans Murray (Maryland)
Anthony Wayne (Georgia)
Joshiah Parker (Virginia)
Samuel Sterett (Maryland)
Thomas Tudor Tucker (South Carolina)
Hugh Williamson (North Carolina)
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DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW ENGLAND 
MID-ATLANTIC, AND SOUTHERN BLOCS AND FRINGES
TOTAL NEW ENGLAND MID-ATLANTIC SOUTHERN
STATE ]MEMBERS BLOC FRINGE BLOC FRINGE BLOC FRINGEVermont 2 2(100%) - - - - -
New Hampshire 3 3(100%) - - - - -
Massachusetts 8 4 (50%) 2 (25%) - - - -
Connecticut 5 1 (20%) 2 (40%) 2 (20%) — - -
Rhode Island 1 1(100%) - - - -
New Jersey 4 3 (75%) 1 (25%) — 1 (25%) — —
New York 6 - - 2 (33%) 1 (17%) - 1 (17%)Pennsylvania 8 - - 4 (40%) 2 (25%)Delaware 1 - - - - - -
Maryland 6 — — — — 1 (17%) 3 (50%)Virginia 10 - - - - 9 (90%) 1 (10%)North Carolina 5 - - - - 1 (20%) 3 (60%)South Carolina 5 - - - - 2 (40%) 1 (20%)Georgia 3 - - - 2 (67%) 1 (33%)
Total 67 14 (21%) 5 (7%) 8 (12%) 2 (3%) 17 (25%) 10 ( 15%
APPENDIX
APPENDIX 6
POPULATION (DF THE UNITED STATES AT THE FIRST CENSUS1
State Free Persons 3/5 of Slaves TotalVermont 85,523 10 85,533New Hampshire 141,727 95 141,822Massachusetts 475,327 0 475,327Rhode Island 67,877 569 68,446Connecticut 235.182 1.658 236.8401,005,636 2,332 1,007,968
New York 318,796 12,794 331,590New Jersey 172,716 6,854 179,570Pennsylvania 430,636 2,242 432,878Delaware 50.209 5.332 55.541972,357 27,422 999,579
Maryland 216,692 61,822 278,514Virginia 454,983 175,576 630,559Kentucky 61,247 7,458 68,705North Carolina 293,179 60,343 353,522South Carolina 141,979 64,256 206,235Georgia 53.284 17.558 70.8421,221,364 387,013 1,608,377
Total 3.199.357 416.767 3.615.924
^Heads Of Families At The First Census Of The United 
States Taken In The Year 1790: Vermont (Baltimore: 
Genealogical Publishing Company, 1966), 4.
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